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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION No. 294, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5882 
TOWN OF WHITEHALL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-5882 - 2 -
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time Motor Equipment Operators and Deputy Highway 
Superintendent. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent, part-time employees, and clerical staff. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 294, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome Lefkovtftz, Chaippflan 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5883 
TOWN OF OTISCO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 317, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Certification - C-5883 -2 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time Motor Equipment 
Operators and Laborers. 
Excluded: Town Highway Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 693, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHEROOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5886 
TOWN OF SMITHVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 693, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-5886 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time Heavy Equipment Operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 693, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 




Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5891 
TOWN OF SCHODACK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, COUNCIL 82, 
Incumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
1
 The incumbent bargaining agent, New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 
Council 82, has disclaimed any interest in representing the existing bargaining unit. 
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been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time employees of the Town of Schodack in the following 
positions: Police Officer, Sergeant, Detective Sergeant, Lieutenant 
and Dispatcher. 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
^ / Y Mjt. 
Robert S.l-lite, Member 
e__ 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5898 
TOWN OF LEON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 264, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and regular part-time Highway Department employees 
employed by the Town of Leon. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 264, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
I jv£A*m^ <X0^W\ 
/VJerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Rite, Member 
\^l^g 
/ Sheila S. Cole^ Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5727 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
I ncu mbent/l ntervenor. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, PC (ERIC J. LARUFFA of counsel), for Petitioner 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES (JOSEPH A. IGOE, Representative), 
for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN J. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Incumbent/lntervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Public Service 
Employees Union (UPSEU) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) which voided seven ballots cast in a mail-ballot election 
conducted pursuant to a petition that UPSEU filed seeking to represent a unit of 
employees of the County of Washington (County) in a unit of titles represented by the 
Case No. C-5727 -2-
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
Having voided the ballots, the Director held that CSEA received a majority of the valid 
votes cast. 
UPSEU argues that the ballots should not have been voided because the PERB 
election agent who challenged them had no authority to do so. CSEA argues that 
UPSEU's exceptions should be denied because it did not file objections to the conduct of 
the election under §201.9(h)(2) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). Alternatively, 
CSEA supports the Director's decision. The County has not responded. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments 
we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
Pursuant to a consent agreement executed by the parties and approved by the 
Director, PERB scheduled a secret mail ballot election among the at-issue County 
employees to determine whether they wished to be represented by CSEA, UPSEU, or 
neither. PERB mailed the ballots and pre-paid return envelopes to eligible voters at the 
addresses provided by the County. Attached to each ballot were "Instructions to Voters" 
(Instructions), which, among other things, directed the voter to return his or her ballot in 
the enclosed return envelope and to sign the outside of the return envelope on the 
signature line provided for that purpose. In addition a "Notice of Election" (Notice) was 
posted by the County at various work locations. The Notice also stated the signature 
requirement. A copy of the Instructions and the Notice was also provided to CSEA and 
UPSEU. The Instructions and the Notice stated that the failure to sign the return 
envelope "may" result in the ballot not being counted. 
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The count was conducted on August 31, 2007. Of 155 eligible voters, 55 cast 
ballots for CSEA, 35 for UPSEU and 14 for "Neither." Seven ballots were challenged by 
PERB's election agent because the ballot envelopes were not signed by the voters. 
Pending resolution of the challenge, the interim tally of ballots showed that there were 
104 valid votes cast, of which CSEA had a majority (55 votes). Therefore, the seven 
challenged ballots could affect the outcome of the election.1 The election agent gave the 
parties a copy of the Interim Tally of Ballots and forwarded the matter to the Director to 
determine how to resolve the challenge. CSEA submitted a letter arguing that the 
challenged ballots should be voided. 
By decision dated September 12, 2007, the Director sustained the election agent's 
challenge to the unsigned envelopes and he voided the ballots, which remain sealed in 
their envelopes. Quoting Town oflslip,2 the Director observed: 
The purpose of the instruction on the Notice of Election and 
in the letter to the voter to sign the return envelope is to 
permit for a ready determination, without resorting to any 
additional investigation, whether the ballot was cast by an 
eligible employee. 
Having sustained the challenge and voided the ballots, the Director's decision provided a 
"Final Tally of Ballots" reflecting the voided ballots and declaring that CSEA received a 
majority of the valid votes cast. 
1
 If the challenged ballots were counted as valid votes, and none were for CSEA, the 
total number of valid votes cast would have been 111, not 104, and CSEA, with 55 votes, 
would have been one short of the necessary majority of valid votes cast. In that event, a 
run-off election would have been conducted between the two entities that received the 
most votes - UPSEU and CSEA. The "Neither" option would have been dropped from 
the available choices. On the other hand, if any of the challenged ballots were for CSEA, 
CSEA would win the election with a majority of the valid votes cast (56 of 111). 
Therefore, the challenge had to be resolved. 
2
 15 PERB 1J4082, at 4116 (1982). 
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DISCUSSION 
We first address CSEA's argument that UPSEU's exceptions are not properly 
before the Board because it failed to file timely objections to the conduct of the election 
as provided in §201.9(h)(2) of the Rules, which, in relevant part, states: 
Any party may file with the director an original and three 
copies of objections to the conduct of the election or conduct 
affecting the results of the election within five working days 
after its receipt of a final tally of ballots. 
However, that provision is inapplicable in this case. It is not necessary to file objections 
to the conduct of an election to resolve challenges to ballots where the challenged ballots 
may affect the outcome of the election. Such challenges must be resolved irrespective of 
whether objections are filed under §201.9(h)(2) of the Rules. Moreover, the Director's 
decision to void the seven challenged ballots was final, subject only to review by the 
Board. Thus, although his decision also contained the final tally of ballots, which 
triggered the time within which objections to the conduct of the election could be filed 
with the Director, we find that exceptions to his decision to void the challenged ballots are 
properly taken pursuant to §213 of the Rules. 
Turning now to the merits of UPSEU's exception, the applicable Rule is 
§201.9(h)(1), which, in relevant part, states: 
Any party or the board's agent may challenge, for good 
cause, the eligibility of any person to participate in the 
election. The ballots of such challenged persons shall be 
impounded. Upon the conclusion of the election, the director 
shall cause to be furnished to the parties a tally of ballots. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In order to be eligible to participate in a mail-ballot election - here, to have one's ballot 
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counted - the envelope containing the ballot must be signed in accordance with PERB's 
Instructions and Notices. Therefore under §201.9 (h)(1) of the Rules, the election agent 
was authorized to challenge the unsigned ballot envelopes because the challenge went 
to the eligibility of the person to participate in the election.3 
Because the unsigned ballot envelopes were properly challenged by the election 
agent and absent agreement by the parties to count the ballots, we affirm the Director's 
decision that those ballots must be voided.4 Indeed, the practice of voiding ballots under 
the circumstances presented in this case is so long-standing that it would be 
inappropriate to alter it retroactively here.5 
In affirming the Director's decision, we note that the general, but not universal, 
practice is that unsigned ballot envelopes are challenged by the election agent before 
any envelopes are opened for the count, sometimes called a "pre-sort." Without showing 
the unsigned envelopes to the parties or revealing the identity of the voters, the election 
agent asks the parties what their positions are with respect to those ballots.6 If the 
parties agree to waive the signature requirement for all of the unsigned ballot envelopes, 
3
 See, e.g., County of Albany and Sheriff, 37 PERB 1J4012 at 4048 n1 (2004). 
4
 See, e.g., County of Oneida, 29 PERB 1J3001 (1996), affg 28 PERB 1J4075 (1995); 
Nassau County Regional Off-Track Betting Corp, 17 PERB 1J4066 (1984); Town of 
Hamburg, 16 PERB fi4082 (1983); Town oflslip, supra note 2 (unsigned ballot envelopes 
were voided). Compare, County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 18 PERB 1J4031, 
4071 (1985) (Director declined to void ballots returned in signed envelopes without the 




 Such an "all-or-none" method of addressing unsigned ballot envelopes avoids the 
potential for "cherry picking" which unsigned envelopes to challenge, which can occur if 
individual challenges are left to the parties, because each envelope bears the 
employee's name and address. 
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PERB withdraws its challenge, and all of the unsigned envelopes are returned to the mix 
of signed envelopes to be opened for the count.7 However, if any party is unwilling to 
stipulate to waive the signature requirement for all of the unsigned ballot envelopes, all of 
the challenged, unsigned envelopes are set aside, and the challenge is resolved by the 
Director, if necessary. If the challenged ballots can affect the outcome of the election, 
under settled practice,8 the unsigned envelopes are not opened and the ballots are 
voided by the Director. 
We consider this an appropriate practice, provided that the parties' stipulation to 
waive the signature requirement is in writing and included in the record of the 
proceeding, and that the Director is satisfied that the integrity of the election is not 
compromised by the waiver.9 In order to ensure consistency in mail ballot elections, we 
instruct the Director to incorporate this process in all future mail-ballot elections. 
We do not know whether this procedure was applied in this case.10 What we 
know from the record before us is that the election agent challenged the ballots cast in 
unsigned envelopes, with full authority to do so, and that CSEA argued to the Director 
7
 Cf. County of Rockland, 10 PERB 1J3084 (1977) (Based on the parties' stipulation, 
PERB counted ballots of persons who might not have been in the bargaining unit). 
8
 See, supra note 4. 
9
 Cf. South Huntington UFSD, 25 PERB 1J3069 (1992) (the integrity of an election was 
compromised by the failure to timely post a notice of election). See, also, State of New 
York (Division of State Police), 15 PERB 1J3014 (1982) (PERB is not bound by parties' 
agreement as to the form of a showing of interest); County of Rockland, 22 PERB 1J4023 
(1989) (PERB is not bound by the stipulations of the parties in a representation case). 
10
 In its brief, CSEA contends that the election agent challenged the unsigned ballot 
envelopes at the outset of the count, and that she asked the parties what their positions 
were with respect to them. According to CSEA, the UPSEU and CSEA agents agreed 
that those ballots should not be counted. There is no record evidence in support. 
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that the ballots should be voided. Therefore, absent the consent of all parties to waive 
the signature requirement, we find that the Director properly voided the ballots. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast valid ballots desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by CSEA, it is, therefore, ordered that the petition should be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed.11 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Kite, Member 
y^ Sheila S. Colef Member 
,J 
11
 Chairman Lefkowitz and Deputy Chair Herbert did not participate in the deliberations 
and decision concerning this matter. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5606 
CITY OF TROY, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
) : 
GARY M. FAVRO, for Petitioner 
GOLBERGER AND KREMER (BRYAN J. GOLDBERGER of counsel), 
for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Incumbent/lntervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Public Service Employees 
Union (UPSEU) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) which voided three ballots cast in a mail-ballot election conducted 
pursuant to a petition that UPSEU filed seeking to represent a unit of employees of the City of 
Troy (City) in an existing unit of titles represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
) • 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). Because the three ballots were void, CSEA 
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received a majority of the valid votes cast.1 
UPSEU argues that the ballots should not have been voided because the PERB 
election agent who challenged them had no authority to do so. CSEA argues that UPSEU's 
exceptions should be denied because it did not file objections to the conduct of the election as 
required by §201.9(h)(2) of PERB's Rules of Procedure. Alternatively, CSEA supports the 
Director's decision. The City has not responded. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the Director for the reasons stated in our decision in County of 
Washington, which we issued today.2 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible voters in 
the unit who cast valid ballots desire to be represented for the purpose of collective bargaining 
by CSEA, it is ORDERED that the petition should be, and hereby is, dismissed.3 
Dated: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
<// Si s 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
9 iG~ 
Sheila S. Core, Member ^ 
1
 The ballots were counted on October 3, 2006. Of 238 eligible voters, 72 voted for CSEA and 
71 voted for UPSEU. Although an option on the ballot, no employee voted for "Neither." In its 
brief, CSEA contends that the election agent asked the parties what their positions were 
regarding the three challenged ballots and that UPSEU wanted them counted but that CSEA 
objected. 
2
 42 PERB 1J3021 (2009). 
3
 Chairman Lefkowitz and Deputy Chair Herbert did not participate in the deliberation and 
decision concerning this matter. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and 
DONNA GREEN, 
Charging Parties, 
CASE NO. U-26139 
- and -
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
PATRICIA McNEIL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25994 
- and -
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 





INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
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In the Matter of 
J. BARRINGTON JACKSON, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26193 
- and -
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
GERALDINE BARROWS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25995 
- and -
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel) 
for Charging Parties Donna Green and Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
STAFFORD H. BYERS, ESQ., for Charging Parties Patricia McNeil, 
Geraldine Barrows, J. Barrington Jackson, and Mynita Atkinson 
BOND, SCHOENECKAND KING, PLLC (TERENCE M. O'NEIL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER1 
These cases come to us on exceptions to a consolidated decision and 
1
 Chairman Lefkowitz and Depty Chair Herbert did not participate in the 
deliberations and decision concerning this matter. 
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recommended remedial order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) filed by the 
Village of Hempstead (Village) and cross-exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and Robert 
Clark, Geraldine Barrows, Jay Jackson, Patricia MacNeil, Michelle Banks and 
Mynita Atkinson, the individual charging parties. 
As relevant here, the ALJ held that the Village violated §§209-a.1 (a) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by repudiating a 
November 26, 2003 agreement with CSEA which added certain titles to CSEA's 
existing collective bargaining unit, including those held by the individual charging 
parties.2 To remedy the violation, the ALJ directed the Village to cease and 
desist from repudiating the agreement. 
The Village excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that it repudiated the 
agreement. It argues that the agreement was not legislatively approved by the 
Village's Board of Trustees and, therefore, that it was never binding on the 
parties. It also excepts to the ALJ's ruling at the hearing which precluded it from 
adducing evidence as to whether the at-issue titles were properly included in 
CSEA's unit. 
CSEA and the individual charging parties except to the ALJ's remedial 
order. Because the individual charging parties were terminated after the Village 
repudiated the agreement that placed them in CSEA's bargaining unit, they and 
CSEA argue that the ALJ should have ordered the Village to restore them to their 
2
 The ALJ dismissed all of the charges to the extent they alleged that employees 
holding the at-issue titles, including the individual charging parties, were 
terminated in retaliation for their successful efforts to be represented by CSEA, 
finding no evidence that their terminations were improperly motivated. No 
exceptions were filed regarding that finding. 
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former positions with full back pay and benefits. CSEA further argues that the 
ALJ should have ordered the Village to collect and remit membership dues to 
CSEA that it would have received had the Village not repudiated the agreement. 
As discussed herein, we affirm the decision of the ALJ to the extent he 
concluded that the Village violated §§209-a. 1 (a) and (d) of the Act, but on 
different grounds. We deny the Village's exceptions concerning the ALJ's ruling 
not to allow testimony as to whether the titles should have been included in 
CSEA's bargaining unit, and we deny the cross-exceptions based on the failure 
of the ALJ to order the Village to restore the employees who held the at-issue 
titles to their former positions with back pay and benefits. We also deny CSEA's 
exceptions to the extent it seeks dues it was allegedly owed. 
FACTS 
The material facts are not in dispute. CSEA and the Village have an 
established collective bargaining relationship concerning a unit of employees, 
and they had a collective bargaining agreement covering the period June 1, 2003 
through May 31, 2008. 
On April 18, 2003, CSEA filed a unit placement petition with PERB, 
designated CP-883, seeking to add fourteen titles (fifteen individuals) to its unit. 
The Village filed a response in opposition, alleging that the individuals are either 
managerial or confidential employees, or that the titles are not appropriately 
included in CSEA's existing unit. A hearing was scheduled to be conducted by 
an ALJ on December 9, 2003. However, on November 26, the Village and CSEA 
entered into a written stipulation of settlement pursuant to which eight of the 
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fourteen titles were placed into CSEA's unit. The settlement states, in relevant 
WHEREAS, the Village and [CSEA], in order to 
effectuate an agreement to make certain changes to 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between both 
parties dated June 1, 2003 - May 31, 2008 and 
WHEREAS, the Village and [CSEA], in order to 
effectuate settlement to the Improper Practice Charge 
[sic] in PERB case # CP-883 in an effort to promote a 
harmonious relationship between the parties in 
interest herein, agree to: 
Allow the following positions in the C.S.E.A. Collective 
Bargaining Agreement; Deputy Village Treasurer, 
Deputy Village Attorney, Secretary to the Planning 
Board, and Superintendent of Parks and Recreation, 
[Here the agreement in evidence contains illegible 
writing indicating additional titles. However, the 
parties stipulated that the illegible titles are Secretary 
to the Board of Trustees, Research Assistant to the 
) Board of Trustees, Secretary to the Fire Department 
and Assistant Superintendent of the Department of 
Public Works]. 
Allow the Mayor of the Village full control over such 
positions in regards to starting salary, posting and 
filling of said positions. 
The agreement was signed by CSEA's Local President, John C. Shepard, and 
the Village's Mayor, James A. Garner.3 
In consideration for the Village's agreement to place the eight 
aforementioned titles into CSEA's bargaining unit, CSEA agreed to withdraw its 
petition to accrete all fourteen titles. The Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation approved CSEA's withdrawal of the petition by 
notice to the parties dated December 12, 2003. 
•,
 3
 In a letter to Shepard, also dated November 26, Garner stated that the included 
' titles were not "management confidential titles in the Village of Hempstead." 
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Following the settlement, the newly accreted employees signed dues 
deduction authorization cards, and the Village remitted their dues to CSEA. In 
addition, the Village granted them contractual benefits consistent with the 
collectively negotiated agreement with CSEA. The record does not indicate what 
benefits they were actually accorded. 
Although, as Mayor, Garner was one of the Village's five Trustees, he did 
not put the settlement before the other Trustees for their consideration or 
approval. Indeed, he testified that in his 16 years as Mayor, no similar 
settlements were submitted to the Trustees for their approval. 
Following an election in March 2005, effective April 4, Garner ceased to 
be Mayor. Former Trustee Wayne Hall assumed that post. Eleven days later, on 
April 15, 2005, the Village Trustees adopted a resolution which, after 
acknowledging the prior petition and settlement agreement, declared that the 
accretion of the at-issue titles to CSEA's bargaining unit constituted an 
amendment to the parties' collective bargaining agreement which required 
approval by the Trustees. It renounced the November 26, 2003 settlement, and 
it rescinded "any approval of such agreement which may have previously taken 
place." Finally, the resolution stated that "all such titles remain outside the 
collective bargaining agreement, and not governed by the terms and conditions 
contained therein." 
Beginning in May 2005, Hall requested each of the individual charging 
parties to submit their resignations. When they declined, they were fired. 
The ALJ sustained CSEA's charge to the extent it alleged that the 
Case No. U-26139 -7-
Village's April 15, 2005 renunciation of its obligations under the November 26, 
2003 settlement agreement constituted a repudiation of the agreement. He 
relied on our decision in Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of Buffalo,4 where we stated: 
In several decisions, we have distinguished a contract 
repudiation, which is cognizable as an improper 
practice, from a contract breach or a contract 
enforcement, which is not. In making that distinction, 
we have emphasized that a meritorious repudiation 
claim arises only in "extraordinary circumstances" in 
which a party to the contract denies the existence of 
an agreement or acts in total disregard of the 
contract's terms without any colorable claim of right. 
Finding no colorable claim of right for the Village's April 15, 2005 renunciation of 
the November 26, 2003 agreement, the ALJ held that the Village violated §§209-
a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act. To remedy the violation, the ALJ ordered the Village to 
cease and desist from repudiating the November 26 settlement agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
In Town of Clay (hereinafter "Clay"),5 the Board found that a town's 
legislative body had acquiesced to the executive recognition of a union. The 
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, finding insufficient record 
4
 25 PERB 1J3064, at 3135 (1992). See also State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services), 39 PERB P033 (2006); Board ofEduc of the City Sch 
Dist of the City of Buffalo, 39 PERB H3029 (2006); State of New York (SUNY 
College at Potsdam), 22 PERB fl3045 (1989); Monticello Cent Sch Dist, 22 
PERB 1J3002 (1989); Addison Cent Sch Dist, 17 PERB 1J3076, affg 17 PERB 
114566(1984). . 
5
 6 PERB 1J3072 (1973), reversed and remanded sub nom. Town of Clay v 
Helsby, 45 AD2d 292, 7 PERB 1J7012 (4th Dept 1974), decision on remand, 7 
PERB H3059 (1974), revd, 51 AD2d 200, 9 PERB 1J7001 (4th Dept 1976). The 
decision on remand and its later reversal are not relevant here. 
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evidence of such acquiescence. The Court went on to note that recognition 
under the Act is a legislative function, and that the legislative body there neither 
"approved" nor "authorized" the recognition.6 
Clay lends support to the Village's assertion that it had a colorable claim of 
right to renounce the Mayor's settlement of the earlier unit placement petition by 
which he, arguably, recognized CSEA as bargaining agent for a newly configured 
unit without legislative approval. Therefore, we find that the Village did not 
repudiate the agreement. Our inquiry, however, does not end there. The 
gravamen of the improper practice charges here is not that the Village denied 
negotiated benefits with no colorable claim of right, but that it unilaterally denied 
the employees the representational rights that they obtained under the settlement 
agreement that they enjoyed for nearly 18 months. 
In County of Orange,7 we held that a public employer violates the Act by 
unilaterally altering an existing collective bargaining unit, reversing a line of cases 
which held that such unilateral action was permissible during an "open period" 
when a representation petition could be filed. In a later decision, also involving 
the County of Orange,8 we held that the wholesale withdrawal of recognition of 
an incumbent union for an existing bargaining unit was, likewise, unlawful. 
There, again, the Board reversed a line of cases which suggested that such a 
withdrawal was permissible during an open period if the employer had "objective 
6
 Cf., Town of Evans, 18 PERB P006 (1985) (Board found legislative approval of 
a recognition, despite possible technical non-compliance with NYS Town Law). 
714 PERB 113060(1981) 
8
 County of Orange, 25 PERB 1J3004 (1992). 
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evidence that the employee organization no longer represents an appropriate 
unit or enjoys majority status. . . ."9 In the second County of Orange decision, 
we observed:10 
[T]he policies of the Act are best served by requiring 
that representation disputes be channeled through the 
procedures available under our Rules rather than left 
to an employer's unilateral action. We believe that in 
this way instability and uncertainty in the parties' labor 
relations will be eliminated or minimized and the rights 
of all parties can best be protected. 
Therefore, while we find that the Village did not "repudiate" the settlement 
agreement with CSEA, it violated §§ 209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act by unilaterally 
altering CSEA's existing bargaining unit, unless there is merit to its defense; i.e., 
that the at-issue titles were never in CSEA's unit, as a matter of law, because the 
November 26, 2003 agreement which placed them there was not legislatively 
approved. 
Although Clay stands for the proposition that recognition is a legislative 
function, the recognition at issue there was to establish an initial bargaining 
relationship with a union under the Act. The term "recognition" is defined in the 
Act as "the designation of an employee organization as negotiating 
representative of employees in an appropriate unit by a government not acting 
through an impartial agency". In light of this definition, we read Clay to mean that 
where a stranger to. the employment relationship - an employee organization -
first seeks to establish a bargaining relationship under the Act, recognition 
requires some form of legislative action. Clay does not speak to the legislative 
9
 Hempstead Union Free Sch Dist, 7 PERB 1J3017, at 3025 (1974). 
10
 County of Orange, supra note 8, at 3016. 
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body's involvement in the bargaining relationship after a union has been 
recognized. 
Under the Act a legislative body has a very limited role in the collective 
bargaining relationship. Section 201.12 of the Act defines the term "agreement" 
as "the result of the exchange of mutual promises between the chief executive 
officer of a public employer and an employee organization," and modifications to 
a contractual recognition clause are permissive subjects for such negotiations.11 
The Act also provides that agreements between the employer's chief 
executive officer and a recognized or certified employee organization are binding, 
"except as to any provisions therein which require approval by a legislative body, 
and as to those provisions, shall become binding when the appropriate legislative 
body gives its approval."12 Section 204-a identifies those aspects of an 
agreement that require legislative approval; i.e., terms of the agreement that 
require an "amendment of law" or "additional funds" to permit their 
implementation. 
As relevant here, the accretion of employees to an existing unit simply 
effectuates the representational rights that they possess under the Act. No 
amendment of the Village's laws would be required.13 Likewise, the mere 
accretion of employees to a unit does not require the appropriation of "additional 
11
 See, e.g., Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 25 PERB 1J3044 (1992), 
modified on other grounds sub nom. Matter of Onondaga-Cortland-Madison Bd 
of Coop Educ Servs v Kinsella, 198 AD2d 824, 26 PERB 1J7015 (4th Dept 1993). 
12
 Act, §201.12. 
13
 A local law that would prevent employees from exercising their rights under the 
Act would be unenforceable. 
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funds." Although negotiated benefits for accreted employees might require such 
approval, the issue here is not whether the employees are entitled to negotiated 
benefits. 
Accordingly, we find that the November 26, 2003 agreement did not 
require legislative action under Clay or legislative approval under §204-a of the 
Act. It was, therefore, binding on the parties. Indeed, in reliance on the 
agreement, CSEA withdrew its petition to add the at-issue titles and others to its 
bargaining unit, and the Village honored the agreement for nearly 18 months. 
If the Village believes that the at-issue employees should be designated 
managerial or confidential by PERB, or that their titles should be fragmented from 
the unit, it may file the appropriate application or petition under PERB's Rules of 
Procedure. But, under both decisions involving the County of Orange, supra, it 
may not unilaterally exclude the titles from CSEA's unit. By doing so here, the 
Village violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act. In that regard, the ALJ properly 
excluded the Village's evidence concerning the appropriateness of the inclusion 
of the at-issue titles and employees in CSEA's unit under the settlement 
agreement. Irrespective of whether the employees should be designated 
managerial or confidential, or whether their titles should have been included in 
CSEA's bargaining unit, under both County of Orange decisions discussed 
above, such evidence is relevant only in the context of a properly commenced 
representation proceeding under PERB's Rules. 
As for the remedy, we disagree with CSEA and the individual charging 
parties' argument that we must order the Village to reinstate the employees 
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holding the at-issue titles to their former positions with full back pay and benefits. 
There is no basis to conclude that their terminations were the result of the 
Village's April 15, 2005 resolution that excluded their titles from CSEA's 
bargaining unit, and no exceptions were taken to the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charges to the extent they alleged that the terminations were improperly 
motivated. 
However, in order to restore the status quo ante, we order the Village to 
forthwith restore the at-issue titles to CSEA's bargaining unit, effective April 15, 
2005, when it unilaterally excluded them. We note that as of that date the 
employees holding those titles were still employed and covered by the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. We express no opinion as to the contractual 
rights they may have had, or may yet assert, under that contract regarding their 
subsequent terminations because the issue raises questions of contract 
enforcement that lie outside of our jurisdiction under §205.5 (d) of the Act. 
As for CSEA's argument that it is entitled to membership dues, we first 
note that it is entitled to such remittances from the Village only from unit 
employees. While our order contemplates that the at-issue employees were unit 
employees from April 15, 2005 until their terminations, approximately two 
months, we find that the policies of the Act are not effectuated by requiring the 
Village to track down the employees whom it terminated and collect the 
membership dues they would have had deducted from their wages between April 
15, 2005 and the date of their terminations about two months later, to remit such 
dues to CSEA. 
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THEREFORE, the Village is hereby ordered to: 
1. Forthwith restore the following titles to the bargaining unit represented 
by CSEA, effective April 15, 2005: Deputy Village Treasurer, Deputy Village 
Attorney, Secretary to the Planning Board, Superintendent of Parks and 
Recreation, Secretary to the Board of Trustees, Research Assistant to the Board 
of Trustees, Secretary to the Fire Department and Assistant Superintendent of 
the Department of Public Works; 
2. Cease and desist from implementing the April 15, 2005 resolution of 
the Village Trustees that excluded the aforementioned titles from CSEA's 
bargaining unit; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to 
post notices to employees in CSEA's bargaining unit. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
RoberfS. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Incorporated Village of Hempstead 
in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
^ Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that the Village: 
1. Forthwith restore the following titles to the bargaining unit represented by 
CSEA, effective April 15, 2005: Deputy Village Treasurer, Deputy Village 
Attorney, Secretary to the Planning Board, Superintendent of Parks and 
Recreation, Secretary to the Board of Trustees, Research Assistant to the 
Board of Trustees, Secretary to the Fire Department and Assistant 
Superintendent of the Department of Public Works; 
2. Refrain from implementing the April 15, 2005 resolution of the Village 
Trustees that excluded the aforementioned titles from CSEA's bargaining 
unit. 
Dated By 
on behalf of Incorporated Village of Hempstead 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PLUMBERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1, U.A., AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-25883 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
BROACH & STULBERG, LLP (ROBERT B. STULBERG & LAUREVE D. 
BLACKSTONE of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KAREN SOLIMANDO of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Plumbers Local Union 
No. 1, U.A., AFL-CIO (Local 1) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 
an improper practice charge filed by Local 1 on April 21, 2005, alleging that the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
transferred exclusively performed unit work at a specified plumbing supply shop to a 
private contractor. In addition, the charge alleges that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) 
of the Act when it failed to respond to Local 1's demand to negotiate the decision to 
Case No. U-25883 -2-
transferthe unit work, and when the District failed to respond to Local 1's request for 
information related to the decision to transfer the unit work. 
In his decision, the ALJ dismissed, as untimely, Local 1's allegations that the District 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act with respect to its unilateral transfer of the unit work.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, Local 1 contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that its 
unilateral transfer allegations are time-barred. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erred 
by failing to address two remaining claims in its charge: the District's refusal to negotiate 
the decision to unilaterally transfer the work, and the District's failure to provide Local 1 
with certain requested information about the transfer of the unit work. The District 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing Local 1's unilateral transfer and 
failure to negotiate claims, but we remand the case to the ALJ to address Local 1's 
claim that the District violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act by failing to respond to the request 
for information. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is the second time that the issues raised by Local 1's charge have come 
before the Board. ^ 
In 2006, at the conclusion of Local 1's direct case, the ALJ issued a decision2 
dismissing, as untimely, Local 1's allegations that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
1
 41 PERB 1J4537 (2008). 
2
 39 PERB 114527 (2006). 
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Act by unilaterally transferring unit work to nonunit employees and by failing to negotiate 
its decision to transfer the work. The ALJ found, however, that the District violated 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it failed to provide Local 1 with certain requested 
information about the transfer of the unit work, and he ordered the District to provide 
Local 1 with the following: a list of the work to be performed by the private contractor; a 
statement setting forth financial savings the District expects to realize as a consequence 
of the transfer of the unit work; and copies of all documents relating to the transfer of the 
work including any contract specifications. 
Local 1 filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision dismissing the unilateral transfer 
and failure to negotiate claims and the District filed cross-exceptions challenging the 
ALJ's conclusion that it had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by not supplying Local 1 with 
the requested information. 
After granting all reasonable inferences to the evidence presented by Local 1 
during its direct case, the Board reversed and remanded the case to the ALJ3 on the 
basis that there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the charge was 
untimely. In addition, the Board found that Local 1 had presented sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate a prima facie case that the unit work had been performed exclusively by 
unit employees. The Board remanded the case to the ALJ to permit the parties to 
present additional evidence on the issues of timeliness and exclusivity. 
With respect to the District's cross-exceptions to that portion of the ALJ's 
decision finding that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by failing to respond to 
Local 1's request for information, the Board "reserved decision" and stated: 
3
 39 PERB 1J3014 (2006). 
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The District has raised arguments in its exceptions that 
cannot be addressed based on the evidence in the record 
at the time of the motion to dismiss. The District may renew 
its exceptions to this portion of the ALJ's decision after it 
has presented evidence on this point.4 
Following the remand, the ALJ conducted three additional days of hearing during 
which both Local 1 and the District presented additional evidence. After consideration 
of the evidence contained in the full record, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the 
unilateral transfer and failure to bargain allegations as untimely. However, the ALJ did 
not readdress Local 1's claim that the District violated §209-a.1(d) by failing to respond 
to portions of its information request. 
FACTS 
The District maintains a plumbing supply shop on the second floor of a six-story 
building in Long Island City (LIC), Queens. The LIC plumbing supply shop is comprised 
of two rooms: an office for administrative duties and a larger adjacent warehouse 
containing plumbing materials and supplies. The District has other trade-specific and 
general supply shops in the LIC building and in buildings in the other boroughs. 
In 2002, pursuant to a mayoral directive, the District advertised a request for 
proposals for the consolidation and integration of its supply shops. Strategic Distribution, 
Inc. (SDI) was awarded the bid. In July 2003, the Bronx plumbing supply shop was 
closed and consolidated with the LIC supply shop. As part of that consolidation, Eric 
Weinbaum (Weinbaum), a Regional Facilities Manager with supervisory responsibilities 
over the Bronx and Manhattan supply shops, relocated his office to the third floor of the 
LIC building. In addition, Frank Podmore (Podmore), a District plumber, was transferred 
4
 39 PERB H3014 at 3049. 
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from the Bronx to the LIC plumbing supply shop. In March 2004, Podmore became the 
Local 1 shop steward at the LIC plumbing supply shop. 
Local 1 represents District plumbers, plumber's helpers and supervisor plumbers 
who are responsible for performing plumbing field assignments at the District locations 
throughout New York City. 
Prior to September 2004, six unit employees worked in the office and warehouse 
of the LIC plumbing supply shop performing various duties including: purchasing 
plumbing supplies; taking orders from field plumbers for tools and materials; retrieving 
tools and materials from the warehouse; packaging and shipping tools and materials to 
plumbers in the field; receiving and restocking tools and materials returned from the 
field; and completing forms and entering inventory information into a computer. 
As a shop steward, Podmore communicates with Thomas Kempf (Kempf), a full-
time Local 1 staff member, when work-related issues arise in the LIC plumbing shop. 
Kempf is a former Local 1 Vice President with city-wide representational responsibilities. 
Podmore is authorized to speak directly with Weinbaum and other supervisors to 
resolve work-related issues without the necessity of filing a formal grievance. In his role 
as shop steward, Podmore has spoken with Weinbaum on a number of occasions about 
various issues including overtime,' the demotion of a supervisor plumber, and transfers. 
SDI employees began working in the LIC plumbing supply shop alongside unit 
employees in August 2004. In September 2004, Weinbaum directed Podmore and 
other unit employees to return copies of the keys to the locked warehouse and to assist 
SDI employees working in the office and the warehouse. During the same period, 
Weinbaum told Podmore that SDI would be taking over all supply shop duties and the 
District changed the lock to the warehouse. 
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In response to the District's directive, Podmore contacted Kempf in September 2004. 
Kempf advised Podmore to comply with the directive by returning the warehouse keys and 
by continuing to work with the SDI employees.5 Following the directive, Podmore had 
further conversations with Weinbaum and other Regional Facilities Managers about SDI 
employees working in the LIC plumbing supply shop. He also had additional conversations 
with Kempf about SDI employees working in the plumbing supply shop. 
After the District's September 2004 directive, the responsibilities of unit employees 
inside the LIC plumbing supply shop were substantially curtailed to occasional 
administrative office duties and their access to the warehouse limited to assisting SDI 
employees. 
In late December 2004, Podmore informed Kempf that unit employees would no 
longer be working in the supply shop and that the work would now be handled 
exclusively by SDI. After Kempf contacted Local 1's counsel, a letter was faxed to the 
District on December 30, 2004 objecting to the transfer of the unit work, demanding the 
commencement of negotiations over the District's decision to transfer the work and 
requesting certain information from the District. 
It is undisputed that the District did not respond to Local 1's information request. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, Local 1 challenges the ALJ's dismissal of portions of its charge 
as untimely. In New York State Thruway Authority,6 we reiterated that when 
determining the timeliness of a charge, we will examine when the employee 
5
 Transcript pp. 12, 89, 315-316. 
6
 40 PERB lf3014 (2007). 
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organization had actual or constructive knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis 
for its charge.7 
Unlike the procedural setting in our earlier decision with respect to Local 1's 
charge, the case now comes to us on a full evidentiary record. Therefore, Local 1 is not 
entitled to all reasonable inferences to its evidence as we granted in our prior decision. 
Rather, we examine the record to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that the charge was filed within the four month period after Local 1 knew 
or should have known of the unilateral transfer pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). 
The evidence establishes that, in September 2004, Local 1 had actual knowledge 
that the performance of unit work in the LIC plumbing supply shop was transferred by 
the District to SDI. Therefore, the charge is untimely with respect to the unilateral 
transfer of the work as well as the District's decision to transfer. 
Contrary to Local 1's argument, the District's transfer of the unit work was not 
done in secret. Local 1 shop steward Podmore was aware in September 2004 that SDI 
employees were performing unit work in the LIC plumbing supply shop and that the 
District had placed substantial limitations on unit employee access to the warehouse 
where the plumbing supplies were maintained. In fact, the District changed the lock to 
the warehouse and thereafter unit employees were permitted access only to assist SDI 
employees. 
7
 See also, Otselic Valley Cent Sch Dist, 29 PERB 1J3005 (1996); Cold Spring Cent Sch 
Dist, 36 PERB 1J3016 (2003), confirmed sub nom. Cold Spring Harbor Teachers Assn v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 12 AD3d 442, 37 PERB 1J7009 (2d Dept 2004); 
Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 39 PERB fi3014 (2006). 
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Podmore is authorized to speak with District representatives on behalf of Local 1 
to resolve work related issues at the LIC plumbing supply shop and he had several 
conversations with Weinbaum and other Regional Facilities Managers about SDI 
employees working in the supply shop. In addition, Podmore had a series of 
conversations, beginning in September 2004, with Local 1 staff member Kempf about 
the work being performed by SDI employees in the supply shop. Kempf was aware that 
the District had directed unit employees to turn in their keys to the warehouse. 
Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that both Podmore and 
Kempf had representational duties and responsibilities sufficient to bind Local 1 to the 
information they received in September 2004 of the District's decision to transfer the 
unit work as well as the transfer of such work. Local 1's subsequent demand on 
December 30, 2004 to negotiate the District's decision to unilaterally transfer the work 
did not toll the applicable four-month time period. Therefore, Local 1's charge, filed on 
April 21, 2005, is untimely because it was filed more than four months after it became 
aware of the unilateral change. 
Finally, we grant Local 1's exceptions challenging the ALJ's failure to address its 
claim that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by failing to respond to Local 1's 
information request. There was an inconsistency in the Board's earlier decision with 
respect to this aspect of the charge. In the decision, the Board stated that it had 
"reserved decision" on the District's cross-exception to the ALJ's finding of a violation of 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Act but, at the same time, remanded the case for the presentation of 
additional evidence on the issue. This inconsistency resulted in the ALJ inadvertently 
failing to readdress the issue following the close of the evidentiary record. To ensure 
that all parties have a full and fair opportunity to address the issue in exceptions to the 
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Board, we are remanding the case to the ALJ for a decision on this aspect of Local 1's 
charge. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant Local 1's exceptions, in part, and remand the 
case to the ALJ for the limited purpose of addressing Local 1's allegations in the charge 
that that the District failed to provide necessary and relevant information. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the allegations of the charge with respect to 
the District's unilateral transfer of the unit work must be, and hereby is, dismissed and 
the case is remanded to the ALJ for further processing consistent 
with this decision. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
£2_ 
-~7^ 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-27042 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CHARLENE M. INDELICATO, COUNTY ATTORNEY (FREDRICK M. 
SULLIVAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Westchester 
(County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Westchester County Department of Public Safety Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA) alleging that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred the exclusive 
PBA unit work of air transporting extradited prisoners to the United States Marshals 
Service (Marshals Service). 
The County filed an answer admitting that PBA unit employees exclusively 
performed the duties of air transporting extradited prisoners prior to the County 
assigning air transport duties to the Marshals Service in June 2006. In its answer, the 
County affirmatively asserts that the at-issue work being performed by the Marshals 
Service is not substantially similar to the work performed by the unit employees. 
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Following a hearing, the ALJ issued her decision1 concluding that the County 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally transferred the air transporting duties 
to the Marshals Service. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County asserts three grounds in its exceptions challenging the ALJ's 
decision finding that it violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: a) the work being performed by 
the Marshals Service is not substantially similar to work performed by PBA unit 
employees; b) there has been a significant change in job qualifications warranting the 
application of a balancing test between the respective interests of the County and PBA; 
and c) the County's interests in utilizing the Marshals Service outweigh PBA's interest in 
retaining exclusivity over the at-issue work. PBA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.2 
1
 41 PERB H4601 (2008). 
2
 We infer from the record that the ALJ applied her discretion not to defer the merits of the 
charge to arbitration based upon the preference of the parties to have a merits decision 
rendered on the charge. A merits deferral would have been appropriate, however, because 
PBA has a reasonably arguable source of right from the maintenance of standard clause 
in the parties' expired collectively negotiated agreement. County of Westchester, 30 PERB 
H3073 (1987), on remand 31 PERB 1J4623 (1998), affd 32 PERB P016 (1999), pet 
dismissed, Westchester County Police Officers' Bene Assn v New York State Pub Empl 
Rel Bd, 32 PERB 1J7023 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), revd and remanded, 279 AD2d 
847, 34 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dept 2001), Iv denied, 34 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dept 2001J, Iv 
dismissed, 96 NY2d 886, 34 PERB.U7033 (2001J, 97 NY2d 692, 35 PERB 1J7001 (2002), 
on remand, pet dismissed, 34 PERB 1J7032 (Sup Ct Albany County 2001), affd, 301 AD2d 
850, 36 PERB 1J7001 (3d Dept 2003). Based upon the demonstrated preference of the 
parties in the present case, and the development of a full record before the ALJ, the Board 
will not, on its own motion, defer the merits of PBA's charge. County of Sullivan and 
Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB 1J3006 (2008). 
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FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the exceptions. 
PBA represents a unit of County employees which includes detectives working in 
the County Department of Public Safety's Fugitive Warrant Unit (FWU). For at least two 
decades prior to June, 2006, FWU detectives exclusively performed the duties 
associated with transporting extradited prisoners incarcerated in other states and 
jurisdictions. Depending on the location of the prisoner, detectives drive and/or fly to 
effectuate the extradition. In general, two detectives are assigned to escort a single 
prisoner; however, when two prisoners are being extradited, three detectives will be 
assigned. 
When the location of a prisoner requires air transport, detectives take a 
commercial flight and rent a car to drive to the detention facility where the prisoner is 
incarcerated or detained. After obtaining custody of the prisoner, detectives drive back 
to the airport and escort the prisoner during a return commercial flight. Prior to 
boarding, detectives search the prisoner, interface with airline staff and show the 
required documentation. While on board, detectives are armed and sit on each side of 
the handcuffed prisoner in the back of the plane. Detectives have complete supervision 
over the prisoner during the flight, including providing medication to the prisoner, if 
necessary. In case of an emergency or disturbance, detectives are instructed to defer 
to airline crew members. 
In June, 2006, the County began to utilize the Marshals Service for air transport 
extraditions of prisoners pursuant to a Cooperative Prisoner Transportation Agreement. 
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County Department of Public Safety Chief Inspector Martin McGlynn (McGlynn) testified 
that air transport extraditions were reassigned to the Marshals Service for purposes of 
economy. 
FWU detectives, however, continue to exclusively perform extraditions that do 
not require air travel. In addition, they continue to be assigned to specifically defined air 
transport extraditions and perform other airtransport extraditions when the Marshals 
Service declines or is unable to perform an assignment. 
The Marshals Service utilizes its own aircraft, staffed by aviation enforcement 
officers, for airtransport extraditions; it does not utilize commercial airlines for that 
purpose. The Marshals Service's aircraft has the capacity to transport 200 federal and 
state prisoners per flight. Aviation enforcement officers have custodial responsibilities 
over the prisoners while in flight on the Marshals Service's aircraft and they are required 
to respond to emergencies and disturbances that may arise. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that a unilateral transfer of exclusively performed bargaining unit 
work to nonunit employees, for economic or other reasons, will be found to violate §209-
a.1(d) of the Act unless the work reassigned is not substantially similar to the 
exclusively performed unit work.3 If, however, there has been a significant change in 
-job qualifications or there has been a curtailment in the level of services, we will balance 
3
 See, Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, 18 PERB1J3083 (1985); Town of West Seneca, 19 
PERB P028 (1986); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 (2008), 
confirmed and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittiur, 42 PERB 
1J3016 (2009). 
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the respective interests of the public employer and the unit employees, both individually 
and collectively, to determine whether there has been a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act4 
The County, in its exceptions, argues that the air transport extradition duties 
performed by the Marshals Service are not substantially similar to the work previously 
performed exclusively by the PBA unit. The basis for the County's argument is 
premised on the fact that aviation enforcement officers, unlike FWU detectives, 
supervise a plane-load of prisoners being extradited or transported to and from various 
jurisdictions on a specially equipped Marshals Service aircraft. In addition, aviation 
enforcement officers are required to respond to emergencies and disturbances that 
occur during flight. 
In determining whether work performed by nonunit employees is substantially 
similar, we examine the nature of the work itself.5 In the present case, the record firmly 
supports the ALJ's conclusion that the air transport extradition duties performed by the 
Marshals Service are substantially similar, if not identical, to the work performed by PBA 
unit employees: obtaining physical custody of a prisoner from a detention facility on 
behalf of the County; searching and accompanying the prisoner during flight; and 
delivering the prisoner to County law enforcement officials. 
4
 Supra note 3. 
5
 State of New York (Dept of Correctional Serv), 27 PERB 1J3055 (1994;, confirmed sub 
nom. State of New York Dep't of Correctional Serv v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
220 AD2d 19, 29 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dept 1996); City of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB 1J3085 
(1998). 
"> 
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Contrary to the County's argument, differences between the aircrafts used by the 
County and the Marshals Service does not demonstrate dissimilarity in the work 
performed on behalf of the County.6 Similarly, the fact that aviation enforcement 
officers are assigned additional duties by the Marshals Service, including supervising 
the transport of a much larger number of prisoners for multiple other jurisdictions, is 
immaterial to our determination whether the nature of the air extradition transport work 
performed on behalf of the County is substantially similar.7 
Finally, we reject the County's contention that there has been a significant 
change in job qualifications requiring a balancing between the respective interests of the 
parties. In support of its argument, the County relies on the terms of the aviation 
enforcement officer job description to identify nominal differences in qualifications such 
as knowledge of Marshal Service's policies and training in penology. 
The fact that PBA unit work was "reassigned to employees with different 
qualifications does not mean that the qualifications for performing the work have 
changed."8 In order for such differences to trigger the application of the balancing test, 
6
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro Sys, Inc, 30 PERB 1J3068 (1997); New York State 
ThruwayAuth, 33 PERB 1J3017 (2000), confirmed sub nom. New York State Thruway 
Auth v Cuevas, 279 AD2d 851, 34 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 2001); Erie County Water 
Auth, 35 PERB 1J3043 (2002). 
7
 County of Erie and Erie Community Coll, 39 PERB p005. (2006). 
8
 Supra note 7, at 3020. 
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the different job qualifications must be substantially related to the duties actually 
performed.9 
In the present case, application of the balancing test is unnecessary because it is 
undisputed that the County's decision to transfer the unit work to the Marshals Service 
was unrelated to the minor differences that exist in the qualifications between an 
aviation enforcement officer and an FWU detective. The cited differences in the 
qualifications are not substantially related to the tasks performed on behalf of the 
County. Neither is there evidence in the record demonstrating that the Marshals 
Service provides an altered level or quality of services on behalf of the County than that 
provided by FWU detectives. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit personnel the work 
of air transport extradition exclusively performed by employees within the 
bargaining unit represented by PBA; 
2. Forthwith restore the work of air transport extradition to employees in the unit 
represented by PBA; 
9
 Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist, 28 PERB 1J3039 (1995), confirmed Hewlett-
Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 232 AD2d 560, 29 
PERB 1J7019 (2d Dept 1996). 
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Offer reinstatement to all unit employees transferred as a result of the 
County's transfer of air transport extradition work, under the prevailing terms 
and conditions of employment as they existed when the work was transferred; 
Make whole all unit employees affected by the transfer of air transport 
extradition for any loss of wages, including overtime pay, suffered by reason 
of the transfer of the unit work, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
Sign and conspicuously post the attached notice at all locations throughout 
the County customarily used to communicate information to unit employees. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees of the County of Westchester (County) in the unit 
represented by the Westchester County Department of Public Safety Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) that the County will: 
1. Not unilaterally transfer to nonunit personnel the work of air transport 
extradition exclusively performed by employees within the bargaining unit 
represented by PBA; 
2. Forthwith restore the work of extradition by aircraft to employees in the 
unit represented by PBA; 
3. Offer reinstatement to all unit employees transferred as a result of the 
County's transfer of air transport extradition work, under the prevailing 
terms and conditions of employment as they existed when the work was 
transferred; and 
4. Make whole all unit employees affected by the transfer of the work of 
extradition by aircraft for any loss of wages, including overtime pay, 
suffered by reason of the transfer of unit work, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate. 
Dated . By 
on behalf of County of Westchester 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASENOS. U-27815 
U-27845 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CHARLENE M. INDELICATO, COUNTY ATTORNEY (FREDERICK M. 
SULLIVAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Westchester County 
Department of Public Safety Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conditionally dismissing two charges filed by PBA 
against the County of Westchester (County). 
In Case No. U-27815, PBA alleges that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally issued Operations 
Order 2007-037, requiring unit employees to report their involvement in a domestic 
violence incident resulting in police intervention. In its second charge, Case No. 
U-27845, PBA alleges that the County violated §§209-a. 1 (d) and (e) of the Act when it 
unilaterally subjected the emergency sick leave bank, established under the parties' 
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expired collectively negotiated agreement (agreement), to an audit, and froze employee 
access to the leave bank pending completion of the audit. In response to each charge, 
the County filed an answer which, inter alia, asserts a jurisdictional defense and, in the 
alternative, argues that the charge should be conditionally dismissed and deferred to 
the parties' negotiated grievance arbitration procedure. 
Following the submission of briefs from the parties on the deferral issue, the ALJ 
issued a decision concluding that both charges are subject to the Board's merits 
deferral policy premised upon the maintenance of standards clause in the parties' 
expired agreement and, therefore, conditionally dismissed the charges.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ erred in conditionally dismissing the 
charges on the grounds that she purportedly misinterpreted and misapplied the Board's 
merits deferral policy and its decision in County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff2 
(hereinafter County of Sullivan). In addition, PBA claims that the ALJ's decision is 
inconsistent with Manhasset Union Free School District3 (hereinafter Manhasset). The 
County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision conditionally dismissing the charges. 
1
 41 PERB 1J4590 (2008). 
2
 41 PERB 1J3006 (2008). 
3
 41 PERB P005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on 
remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009). 
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FACTS 
The parties' expired agreement contains a maintenance of standards provision, 
§1.6, which states: 
Conditions of employment in effect prior to this agreement 
and not covered by this agreement shall not be reduced 
without good cause during the term of this agreement. 
"Good Cause" may be determined through the grievance 
procedure herein, including Step 3. 
The agreement also includes §8.5, which establishes an emergency sick leave 
bank administered by PBA, with a PBA board responsible for approving a member's 
eligibility for the sick leave benefits. 
Article X of the agreement sets forth a grievance procedure which ends in 
binding arbitration. 
On June 18, 2007, PBA was notified by the County Commissioner of Human 
Resources that PBA's sick bank records were going to be audited by the County. 
Subsequently, PBA was informed that the emergency sick leave bank would be frozen 
until the County's audit was completed. 
On July 20, 2007, Commissioner-Sheriff Thomas Belfiore issued Operations 
Order 2007-037, requiring unit employees involved in an off-duty domestic violence 
incident resulting in a police response, to provide all relevant information to the Desk 
Officer. Under the prior practice, a unit employee was required to provide such 
notification only when he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation by an outside 
agency. 
PBA did not grieve either the County's actions with respect to the sick leave bank 
or the new off-duty domestic violence notice requirement. 
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DISCUSSION 
In County of Westchester4 the Board held that a PBA improper practice charge 
alleging that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally transferring 
exclusively performed unit work should be deferred on the merits to the parties' 
grievance procedure, and conditionally dismissed the charge, because the maintenance 
of standards clause in the parties' agreement is a reasonably arguable source of right 
to the PBA. This is the identical contract clause that the ALJ, in the present charges, 
found to be an appropriate basis for a merits deferral. 
In its exceptions, PBA asserts that the ALJ erred by following the Board's 
decision in County of Westchester. We disagree. Contrary to the PBA's argument, 
while the subject matter of the alleged unilateral changes in the present charges are not 
a transfer of unit work, this difference does not constitute a colorable argument for 
distinguishing the holding in County of Westchester. 
Similarly, we find no merit in PBA's argument that the ALJ applied an incorrect 
standard by inadvertently omitting the prefatory term "reasonably" from the phrase 
"arguable source of right" when articulating the standard. In County of Westchester, the 
Board held, without modifying the applicable standard for a merits deferral, that the 
maintenance of standards clause in the parties' agreement "is a source of right to the 
4
 30 PERB 113073 (1997), on remand, 31 PERB1J4623 (1998), affd, 32 PERB 1J3016 
(1999), petition dismissed, Westchester County Police Officers' Benevolent Assn v New 
York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 32 PERB 1J7023 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), revd and 
remanded, 279 AD2d 847, 34 PERB H7002 (3d Dept, 2001), Iv denied, 34 PERB fi7016 
(3d Dept 2001), Iv dismissed, 96 NY2d 886, 34 PERB 1J7033 (2001), 97 NY2d 692, 35 
PERB H7001 (2002), on remand, petition dismissed, 34 PERB 1J7032 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 2001), affd, 301 AD2d 850, 36 PERB fl7001 (3d Dept 2003). In its brief, PBA 
omitted reference to its four years of unsuccessful litigation seeking to overturn the 
Board's decision to defer its earlier charge. 
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PBA"5 with respect to that unilateral change, (emphasis added) In the present case, we 
are satisfied that the ALJ, by citing Board precedent,6 and reiterating the applicable 
standard for merits deferral, applied the proper standard in conditionally dismissing the 
charges. 
We also reject PBA's contract interpretation argument, which asserts that 
because the County policies at issue are new, they are outside the scope of the 
maintenance of standards clause. In contending that the Board should determine the 
merits of PBA's contract argument as part of its review of the ALJ's conditional 
dismissal, PBA demonstrates a misunderstanding of the Board's decades-old merits 
deferral doctrine. The merits deferral policy favors resolution of contract arguments, 
like the ones made by the PBA in its exceptions, through the parties' negotiated 
grievance arbitration procedure when the agreement is a reasonably arguable source of 
right and a final arbitration award may be dispositive of the charge. 
We next turn to PBA's assertion that the ALJ misapplied the Board's decision in 
County of Sullivan. Based upon our review of PBA's arguments, it is clear that PBA has 
substantially misconstrued County of Sullivan. Our decision in that case did not 
constitute a paradigmatic shift, as claimed by PBA, or even a modification in our merits 
deferral policy. In fact, in County of Sullivan, we reaffirmed that merits deferral is 
ordinarily appropriate, as in the present case, when an alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) 
of the Act and an alleged violation of §209-a.1 (e) of the Act rests upon the same set of 
facts. At the same time, we reiterated that a merits deferral of an alleged violation of 
530PERBH3073at3181. 
6
 See, State of New York (SUNY Health Science Center of Syracuse), 30 PERB U3019 
(1997); County of Sullivan, supra note 2. 
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§209-a.1(e) of the Act is not always appropriate because PERB has been granted 
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims and, therefore, deferral will be dependent on the 
circumstances of each case.7 
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that PBA has failed to 
demonstrate any circumstances warranting our retention of jurisdiction over either 
charge beyond that which is implicit in New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky).8 It 
is clear from the record that there is not a mutual preference by the parties for the 
Board to retain jurisdiction over the alleged violation of §§209-a.1 (d) and (e) of the Act. 
Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by PBA's conclusory assertion that an arbitration 
award will not be dispositive of the charges. In support of its argument, PBA does not 
allege or demonstrate that the merits deferral in County of Westchester9 resulted in an 
arbitration award that was not dispositive of its earlier charge. 
Finally, PBA's reliance on our decision in Manhasset is without merit. In 
Manhasset we found that an employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally transferred exclusively performed unit work. In discussing the inapplicability 
of a notice of claim under Educ Law §3813.1, to an improper practice charge, we 
described both the public policy and legislative history underlying our improper practice 
jurisdiction. Our discussion in Manhasset cannot be reasonably interpreted as an 
abandonment or modification of our merits deferral policy, which was first articulated by 
7
 State of New York (SUNY Health Science Center of Syracuse), supra note 6, 30 
PERB 1J3019 at 3043. 
8
 4 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
9
 Supra note 4. 
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the Board shortly after the grant of improper practice jurisdiction by the Legislature.10 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and conditionally 
dismiss charges Case No. U-27915 and Case No. U-27845, subject to a motion to 
reopen should the County interpose any objections to arbitrability, or should the award 
not satisfy the criteria under New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky).^ 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
^ / . ^ / s&kA j 
f
 Robert S. Hfte, Member 
m Sheila S. Cole", Member 
10
 NYCTA (Bordansky), supra note 8. 
11
 Supra note 8. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1342, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-27133 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO SYSTEM, INC., 
Respondent. 
REDEN & O'DONNELL (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL and TERRY M. SUGRUE, of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID M. GREGORY (WILLIAM R. GRADL, of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Local 1342 (ATU) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing 
a charge, as amended, alleging that Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. (Metro) 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally changed the use and purpose of a medical examination, under the terms of 
the parties' collectively negotiated agreement (agreement), by treating the examination 
as the equivalent of an independent medical examination (IME) under the Workers' 
Compensation Law and by submitting the resultant medical reports to the Workers' 
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Compensation Board for purposes of reducing or eliminating an employee's workers' 
compensation benefits.1 
At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of the pleadings as ALJ 
exhibits, and the parties' collectively negotiated agreement as a joint exhibit; no other 
evidence was admitted. In addition, the charge was amended and clarified on the 
record. During a colloquy, ATU agreed to the ALJ's description of the charge as 
alleging that Metro: 
...has unilaterally changed the use and purpose of 
information obtained from medical examinations. 
That historically [Metro] has used the medical exams 
to determine an employee's ability to return to work. 
The change is that now [Metro] has unilaterally 
decided to use these medical examinations as the 
equivalent of an Independent Medical Exam... and is 
submitting such related medical reports to [the 
' Workers' Compensation Board] for the purpose of 
reducing or eliminating Workers' Compensation 
benefits.2 
Following the colloquy, the ALJ directed ATU to file an offer of proof, and for 
Metro to respond to the offer, with respect to two issues: Metro's duty satisfaction 
defense; and whether the subject matter of the amended charge is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations under the Act. 
In its offer of proof, ATU relied solely upon the facts alleged in the amended 
charge, as clarified, and reiterated that Metro historically utilized the negotiated medical 
examination to determine an employee's ability to return to work from a leave of 
1
 The original charge alleged direct dealing by Metro, in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) 
of the Act. At the hearing before the ALJ, ATU withdrew the claim along with the related 
allegations contained in the details of the charge. Transcript, pp. 10-13. 
2
 Transcript, pp. 12-13. 
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absence. In addition, it reframed, in part, the allegations of the charge by claiming that 
Metro unilaterally changed the purpose of the negotiated examination by treating it as 
the equivalent of an IME and submitting resultant medical reports to the Workers' 
Compensation Board to reduce or eliminate the subject employee's Workers' 
Compensation benefits. According to ATU's offer, Metro did not satisfy its duty to 
negotiate because the negotiated provisions of the agreement do not explicitly or 
implicitly touch upon the subject matter of the charge. Finally, it argued that the subject 
of the unilateral change is a mandatory subject under the Act. In response, Metro 
argued that the provisions of the agreement supported its duty satisfaction defense. 
Following submission of ATU's offer and Metro's response, the ALJ issued a 
decision dismissing the charge concluding that Metro had satisfied its duty to negotiate 
the subject of the alleged change and that the subject is a nonmandatory subject under 
the Act.3 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, ATU contends that the ALJ misinterpreted the allegations of the 
amended charge and ATU's arguments, inappropriately placed the burden of proof on 
ATU with respect to Metro's duty satisfaction defense, erred in sustaining that defense, 
and erred in concluding that the subject matter of the charge constitutes a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiations. Metro supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge. 
j 
3
 41 PERB U4566 (2008). 
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FACTS 
Metro and ATU are parties to an agreement for the period August 1, 2006-
July 31, 2009 for the Operating and Maintenance and the Office and Clerical Units.4 
Section 8 of the agreement includes negotiated benefits with respect to leaves of 
absence due to a disability. The agreement defines the term "disability" broadly in §8-3 
to include the following: 
heart condition, back condition, injury to limbs or 
conditions affecting use of limbs, pregnancy, vision 
impairment or any other illness, condition, or injury of 
any type which might in any way affect the 
employee's ability to perform all the duties required 
of his or her job classification. 
Section 8.3 requires unit employees to immediately report all such disabilities to 
Metro and it grants Metro the right to require an employee to obtain a medical 
determination as to his or her ability to continue to perform work, and, if necessary, the 
last day when the employee will be able to physically perform all of his or her job duties. 
Under certain circumstances, Metro may require the employee to submit periodic 
medical reports: 
Such employee may, if the condition or doctor's 
report so warrants, be required by the Company to 
obtain periodic physician reports to be delivered to 
the Company with respect to such disability. The 
employee shall have the option to obtain such 
examination by the Company's physician, at 
Company expense, or the employee's physician, at 
the employee's expense, provided if the employee 
elects to go to his or her own physician such 
physician shall submit to the Company on a form 
provided by the Company a report of the employee's 
disability. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 1, §2-1. 
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Finally, §8-3 states, in relevant part, that: 
Should at any time the opinion of the applicable 
physician of the employee be that the employee is 
physically unfit to continue his or her duties, such 
employee shall be granted a leave of absence as 
provided in Section 8-3.1 or Section 8-3.2, 
whichever are applicable, under all of the terms and 
conditions provided in this Section 8. 
Section 8-3.1 of the agreement entitles a full-time employee to a sick leave of 
absence during a period when the employee is unable to reasonably perform his or her 
job duties because of a compensable injury or illness. The right to such a leave of 
absence is conditioned on the employee providing Metro with satisfactory evidence with 
respect to the compensable injury or illness. 
Section 8-3.3 of the agreement states, in relevant, part that: 
The employee on such leave, compensable ornon-
compensable, shall report personally and sign in, or 
if not reasonably possible then in writing, to the 
Company's Industrial Nurse during normal business 
hours for the Human Resources Department at least 
every thirty (30) days and the Company shall be 
privileged from time to time during the period of such 
leave to have the employee examined by a 
physician of its choice....Prior to returning to work an 
employee on such leave of absence, in addition to 
any physical examination that the Company may 
require to be performed by its physician, must 
submit to the Company his or her physician's report 
that he or she is physically able in all respects to 
perform all of the duties and responsibilities of his or 
her job classification, (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to §8-7 of the agreement, disputes between the parties over Metro's 
unreasonable denial or withdrawal of a contractual leave benefit is subject to medical 
arbitration before an impartial physician. 
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When an employee is examined by a Metro doctor "to receive a certificate on 
returning from sick leave, or in connection with required ICC examination, or in 
connection with a claim of such employee under the Worker's Compensation Law" the 
employee is not entitled to his or her regular wages for the time needed to attend the 
examination pursuant to §6-2 of the agreement. The agreement does, however, 
provide that employees, upon request, are entitled to paid leave in order to attend a 
Workers Compensation Board hearing with respect to his or her claim for benefits. 
Metro is self-insured under the Workers' Compensation Law and EM Risk 
Management acts as Metro's third party administrator for workers' compensation 
claims.5 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, ATU contends that the ALJ misconstrued the amended charge 
by failing to recognize that a component of the pleading is an allegation that Metro has 
unilaterally changed the scope and purpose of the negotiated medical examination for a 
compensable injury or illness by treating it as the equivalent of an I ME. According to 
ATU, its use of the term "equivalent" to describe the unilateral change in the negotiated 
medical examination should have been understood by the ALJ as alleging that the 
scope of the examination has been expanded to include all medical issues that are 
subject to review at an IME under the Workers Compensation Law and regulations. 
ATU also claims that the ALJ erred by failing to interpret the charge as alleging 
that Metro is violating the IME notice requirements of the Workers Compensation Law.6 
5ALJ1,f l4. 
6
 Workers' Compensation Law §§137(7) and 11. 
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In considering ATU's exceptions, we accept the truth of the allegations in the 
amended charge, as clarified before the ALJ, and grant all reasonable inferences to the 
facts pleaded.7 
Based upon our examination of the amended charge, as clarified during the 
colloquy at the hearing, we cannot reasonably infer that ATU alleges in the charge that 
the scope of the medical examination has been unilaterally expanded. Our conclusion 
is premised upon two factors: a) the failure of ATU to set forth any alleged facts relevant 
to this issue in its offer of proof; and b) the definition of an IME under the Workers' 
Compensation Law and regulations, which includes an examination for determining a 
claimant's ability to return to work.8 Although ATU's offer states that an IME has a 
functional workers' compensation purpose, ATU did not describe any evidence it 
intended to introduce at a hearing that would demonstrate a substantive expansion in 
the scope of the medical issues considered or the amount of information obtained 
during the negotiated medical examination, beyond an employee's ability to return to 
7
 City of Yonkers, 23 PERB 1J3055 (1990); UFT (Saidin), 40 PERB U3003 (2007); ATU 
(Delahaye), 41 PERB P004 (2008); Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 PERB 
1J3003 (2008). 
812 NYCRR §300.2(b)(4) states: "Independent medical examination means an 
examination performed by an authorized or qualified independent medical examiner, 
pursuant to section 13-a, 13-k, 13-1, 13-m or 137 of the Workers' Compensation Law, for 
purposes of evaluating or providing an opinion with respect to schedule loss, degree of 
disability, validation of treatment plan or diagnosis, causal relationship, diagnosis or 
treatment of disability, maximum medical improvement, ability to return to work, 
permanency, appropriateness of treatment, necessity of treatment, proper treatment, 
extent of disability, second opinion or any other purpose recognized or requested by the 
board." (emphasis added) 
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work. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to ATU's argument over the issue of 
notice. It cannot be reasonably inferred from the allegations that the charge alleges a 
violation of Workers' Compensation Law notice requirements. Furthermore, PERB does 
not have jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Workers' Compensation Law. 
Therefore, we deny ATU's exceptions challenging the ALJ's construction of the 
pleadings.10 
ATU asserts, in its exceptions, that the ALJ reversed the burden of proof when 
she required it to file an offer of proof responding to Metro's duty satisfaction defense. 
It is well-settled that a respondent must plead and prove a duty satisfaction defense.11 
However, the primary purpose of an offer of proof is to clarify the relevant facts, and 
thereby aid the ALJ in further processing the charge. In general, an ALJ is granted 
considerable discretion in the processing of an improper practice charge.12 Requiring an 
offer of proof does not alter the applicable burden of proof. Such a requirement 
provides the party with an opportunity to identify the facts it intends to prove at a 
hearing. In the present case, the ALJ's directive requiring ATU to file an offer of proof 
responding to the duty satisfaction defense was well within her discretion because the 
9
 Similarly, it cannot be reasonably inferred from the charge, as amended and clarified, 
that ATU alleges that Metro is now treating medical examinations for a non-
compensatory injury and illness as the equivalent of an IME and submitting the results 
of such examinations to the Workers' Compensation Board. 
10
 We also reject ATU's contention that the ALJ violated §212.3 of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) by failing to address issues which can not be reasonably inferred 
from its pleading and offer of proof. 
11
 NYCTA, 41 PERB 1J3014 (2008). 
12
 City ofElmira, 41 PERB 1J3018 (2008). 
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alleged facts ATU intended to prove with respect to the defense are integral to the 
merits of the charge, as amended. 
Next, we consider ATU's exceptions challenging the ALJ's upholding of Metro's 
duty satisfaction defense on the merits.. When parties have negotiated a subject to 
completion and have entered into an agreement with respect to that subject, a 
respondent has satisfied its duty to negotiate and, therefore, cannot be found to have 
acted unilaterally in violation of the Act when it takes an action permitted under the 
negotiated terms of the agreement.13 in New York City Transit Authority,™ the Board 
reiterated the applicable standard for determining a duty satisfaction defense: 
A satisfaction of the duty to negotiate necessitates 
record evidence of facts establishing that the parties 
negotiated an agreement upon terms which are 
reasonably clear on the subject presented to us for 
decision. 
In the present case, §8 of the agreement includes a negotiated supplemental 
workers' compensation leave benefit for a compensable injury or illness which is 
conditioned on an employee being subject to periodic medical examinations to 
determine whether the employee is able to return to work. Based upon the direct 
interrelationship between this negotiated supplemental leave benefit and a statutory 
workers compensation claim, we conclude that the subject of the submission of medical 
reports to the Workers' Compensation Board is inherently and inextricably intertwined 
13
 County of Nassau (Police Department), 31 PERB T[3064 (1998); State of New York 
(Workers' Compensation Board), 32 PERB 1J3076 (1999); County of Columbia, 41 
PERB H3023 (2008). 
14
 Supra, note 11. 
15
 41 PERB P014 at 3076 (quoting from Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB 1J3042 at 
3094-3095 [1999]). 
Case No. U-27133 -10-
with the negotiated procedures for the compensable injury or illness leave benefit.16 
Having reached an agreement with Metro on the subject, ATU must seek to enforce that 
agreement if it believes that Metro has violated the negotiated terms. We lack, 
however, jurisdiction to enforce an agreement pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act.17 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny ATU's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ sustaining Metro's duty satisfaction defense. In light of our determination, we 
do not reach ATU's exceptions claiming that the subject matter of the amended charge 
is a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act. 
IT IS/THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
IjCAcnuo^ 
Jerome Lefk Irman 
fAxy? /- 7 J ^ 
Robert S. Hite^ Member 
o4-g^ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
16 County of Nassau (Police Department), supra, note 13. 
17
 Contrary to ATU's argument, the fact that disputes over the grant or withdrawal of the 
supplemental leave benefit are subject to medical arbitration does not defeat Metro's 
duty satisfaction defense. A medical examination to determine an employee's ability to 
return to work is equally relevant to a workers' compensation claim for payment of 
benefits and. a grievance over the grant or denial of the negotiated supplemental leave 
benefit. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Middletown 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) and on exceptions filed by the City of Middletown 
(City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by the City alleging PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it submitted three negotiation proposals to 
compulsory interest arbitration: proposal 11, bill of rights; proposal 12, disciplinary 
procedure; and proposal 13, General Municipal Law (GML) Section 207-c procedure. 
Following submission of the case on a stipulated record, the ALJ issued a 
decision1 concluding that the disciplinary procedure proposal is prohibited and the bill of 
1
 42 PERB 1J4502 (2009). 
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rights proposal is both prohibited and nonmandatory, in part.2 Therefore, the ALJ 
directed PBA to withdraw both proposals. She, however, dismissed the remainder of 
the charge concluding that the PBA's proposal for a GML §207-c procedure is a 
mandatory subject under the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that its disciplinary 
procedure proposal is a prohibited subject of negotiations. It also challenges the ALJ's 
conclusion that the bill of rights proposal is both prohibited and nonmandatory, in part. In 
support of its exceptions, PBA claims that the ALJ misinterpreted and misapplied Board 
and judicial precedent in reaching the decision. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erred in 
concluding that Civ Serv Law §75 is inapplicable to PBA unit employees and that she 
misinterpreted the City of Middletown Charter (City Charter).3 The City supports the ALJ's 
decision with respect to these two proposals. 
The City, in its exceptions, challenges the ALJ's conclusion that the proposed GML 
§207-c procedure is a mandatory subject claiming that the ALJ misapplied applicable law 
in reaching her decision. Specifically, the City asserts that the following portions of the 
proposal are nonmandatory because they usurp the City's right under GML §207-c to 
2
 In the decision's penultimate sentence, however, the ALJ inadvertently referred to the 
bill of rights and disciplinary procedure proposals as being nonmandatory. 
3
 We deny PBA's exception seeking a policy ruling prohibiting an ALJ from rejecting a 
meritless argument raised by a party without the ALJ specifically articulating a rationale 
addressing the demerits of the argument. Section 212.5 of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) does not obligate an ALJ to substantively address every argument presented 
regardless of merit and/or frivolity. Such a rule would be fundamentally impractical and 
would result in unnecessary administrative delays in the processing of improper practice 
charges. Pursuant to §213 of the Rules, a party is entitled to file exceptions to portions 
of an ALJ decision when a party believes the ALJ did not-correctly or properly address 
an argument. 
Case No. U-27423 - 3 -
render an initial eligibility determination: a) the time period for the submission of 
documentation to the claims manager; b) the time frame for an initial determination by the 
claims manager; c) the pre-arbitration procedure permitting a claimant to submit additional 
information to the claims manager for reconsideration of the claim; and d) the arbitration 
procedure for the review of an initial determination denying benefits. PBA supports the 
ALJ's decision finding the GML §207-c proposal to be mandatory. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
' FACTS 
PBA is the recognized representative of a unit of City police officers, sergeants, 
lieutenants and detectives. The most recent collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement) between the City and PBA expired on December 31, 2006. The expired 
agreement does not include a negotiated disciplinary procedure. However, §18.7 of the 
agreement references suspensions made pursuant to Civil Serv Law §75: 
Employees suspended under the provisions of Section 75 of 
the Civil Service Law shall have their health insurance 
premiums paid during the period of unpaid suspension 
unless the period is extended by an action of the employee's 
representative. Periods of imposed penalty after hearing 
shall not require such payment. 
In 1995, the City's Board of Police Commissioners established disciplinary 
procedures for the police department, which were later incorporated, as amended, into 
General Order AGO-027-27 (General Order) issued by the City's Chief of Police. 
Section G(1) of the General Order states: 
Any determination by the Board of Police Commissioners 
shall be final, except that it may be appealed pursuant to 
Section 76 of the N.Y.S. Civil Service Law. 
During an unspecified period, the City issued at least three notices of discipline 
Case No. U-27423 - 4 -
against PBA unit members identifying Civ Serv Law §75 as the legal basis for issuance 
of the notices. The most recent notice, dated February 4, 2008, was issued well after 
the City filed its charge.4 
Following an impasse in negotiations for a successor agreement, PBA filed a 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration containing the three proposals that are the 
subject of the City's charge.5 The disciplinary procedure proposal calls for granting unit 
members a choice between Civ Serv Law §75 and binding arbitration when a notice of 
discipline seeks a suspension of more than 30 days, a demotion or a termination. PBA's 
bill of rights proposal seeks procedural rights for unit members being interrogated or 
interviewed during the course of an official City investigation which may lead to 
disciplinary charges. One section of the bill of rights, §1 .D.7, addresses questioning that 
may relate to a possible criminal investigation. The GML §207-c proposal seeks to 
establish a comprehensive procedure relating to statutory benefits when a unit member 
is injured in the performance of his or her duties, including a hearing procedure before 
an arbitrator to determine whether the City's claims manager had a reasonable basis for 
denying or terminating benefits. 
DISCUSSION 
A. PBA's Exceptions to the ALJ's Decision 
In its exceptions, PBA asserts that the ALJ erred when she concluded that the 
provisions in the City Charter render PBA's disciplinary procedure and bill of rights 
4
 The stipulated record contains two additional redacted copies of notices of discipline 
that are undated. Joint Exhibit I, Attachment E. 
5
 The full bill of rights and disciplinary procedure proposals and relevant excerpts from 
the GML §207-c proposal are reprinted in the ALJ's decision. Supra note 1, 42 PERB 
1J4502 at 4503-04, 4510-13. 
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proposals prohibited subjects of negotiations. According to PBA, the proposals are 
mandatory under Auburn Police Local 195vtielsb/ (Auburn) because Civ Serv Law 
§75 is applicable to members of the PBA unit. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ 
misinterpreted and misapplied Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn of the City of New York, 
Inc. v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd7 (hereinafter NYCPBA), Police Benevolent 
Assn of New York State Troopers, Inc. v Division of State Police8 (hereinafter NYS 
Troopers PBA) New York City Transit Auth v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd,9 
(hereinafter NYCTA) and the Board's decision in Tarrytown Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association, /nc10 (hereinafter Tarrytown). 
In general, the subject of police disciplinary procedures is mandatorily negotiable 
under the Act because it is a term and condition of employment.11 Furthermore, the 
Legislature, in a series of amendments to the Act since 1974, has demonstrated a clear 
and explicit public policy choice for the subject of police disciplinary procedures to be, in 
general, negotiable but excluded from the subjects that can be resolved in compulsory 
662AD2d12, 11 PERB 1(7003 (3d Dept 1978), affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 12PERB1J7006 
(1979). 
7
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB 1J7006 (2006). 
8
 11 NY3d 96, 41 PERB 1J7511 (2008). 
9
 8 NY3d 226, 40 PERB 1J7001 (2007). 
10
 40 PERB H3024 (2007). 
11
 See, City of Albany, 42 PERB P005 (2009); Town ofWallkill, 42 PERB 1J3017 
(2009); See also, Binghamton Civil Service Forum v City of Binghamton, 44 NY2d 23, 
11 PERB T|7508(1978). 
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interest arbitration for specifically defined negotiations units.12 In Auburn, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the reversal of a Board decision13 and held that a proposal to 
negotiate a grievance/arbitration procedure for a unit of police officers, as an alternative 
to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, was not a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
Subsequently, in NYCPBA, the Court reaffirmed the holding in Auburn but held that the 
New York City Charter and Administrative Code, State police disciplinary laws pre-
dating Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76 delegating police disciplinary authority to City officials, 
demonstrate a public policy that outweighs the strong and sweeping policy supporting 
collective negotiations under the Act. The Court, therefore, concluded that negotiations 
over procedures for the interrogation of police officers and police disciplinary 
procedures in New York City were prohibited.14 
In reaching its decision in NYCPBA, the Court cited with favor the decision in 
City of Mount Vernon v Cuevas*5 (hereinafter Mount Vernon) where the Appellate 
12
 See, L 1995, c 432; L 1995, c 447; L 2001, c 586; L 2002, c 220; L 2002, c 232; L 
2003, c 641; L 2003, c 696; L 2004, c 63; L 2005, c 737; L 2007, c 190; L 2008, c 179; L 
2008, c234; §§209.4(e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the Act. See, City of Albany, supra note 
11; Town of Wallkill, supra note 11; Tarrytown Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Inc, 
supra note 9, n.14. The general negotiability of police disciplinary procedures is 
reinforced by Civ Serv Law §75-a and Exec Law §215-a which recognize a right of 
police officers to grieve, under a collectively negotiated agreement, a transfer or penalty 
imposed for failing to obey an order to issue a certain number of tickets and summons 
within a set period of time. 
13
 Auburn Police Local 195, 10 PERB H3045 (1977). 
14
 In addition, the Court held in NYCPBA that another special State law, the Rockland 
County Police Act, rendered a negotiated police disciplinary procedure in the Town of 
Orangetown invalid as violative of public policy. 
15
 33 PERB H7015 (Sup Court Albany County 2000); nor affd, 289 AD2d 674, 34 PERB 
U7038 (3d Dept 2001) Iv denied, 97 NY2d 613, 35 PERB fl7005 (2002). 
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Division, Third Department held that the police disciplinary procedure in a 1922 
municipal charter, enacted by the Legislature, preempts the negotiability of the subject 
under the Act. In NYCPBA and Mount Vernon, the parties did not dispute the 
inapplicability of Civ Serv Law §75 to police officers in those municipal jurisdictions. • 
Since NYCPBA, both the Courts and the Board have held, consistent with 
Auburn, that where Civ Serv Law §75 or analogous general disciplinary statutes are 
applicable to police officers, the subject of police discipline is not a prohibited, subject of 
negotiations under the Act.16 
In Town of Wallkill^ (hereinafter Wallkill) we recently interpreted the negotiated 
waiver of Civ Serv Law §75 procedures in a collectively negotiated agreement as 
constituting a recognition by the parties that those statutory procedures were applicable 
to unit police officers who are honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters. 
Our interpretation was supported by judicial precedent and early 20th century legislation 
granting special disciplinary procedural protections for honorably discharged veterans 
and volunteer firefighters.18 We, therefore, concluded in Wallkill that a negotiated 
procedure to replace Civ Serv Law §75 for honorably discharged veterans and 
volunteer firefighters was not prohibited under Auburn and NYCPBA. 
In the present case, PBA contends that Auburn, rather than NYCPBA, is 
16
 See, Werner v Town ofNiskayuna 41 PERB ^7518 (Sup Ct Schenectady County 
2008) nor; Ellas v Town of Crawford, 17 Misc3d 176, 41 PERB 1J7505 (Sup Ct Orange 
County 2007); City of Albany, supra note 11; Town of Wallkill, supra note 11. 
17
 Supra note 11. 
18
 See, Owen v Town of Wallkill, 94 AD2d 768 (2d Dept 1983) Iv denied, 60 NY2d 560 
(1983); L 1909, c 15; L 1930, c 214. See also, Brown v Stephan, 245 AD 588 (4th Dept 
1935); Wamsley v East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist Bd of Educ, 281 AD2d 633 (2d Dept 
2001). 
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applicable because unit members are covered by Civ Serv Law §75. In its brief, PBA's 
argument vacillates between a claim that Civ Serv Law §75 is applicable to the entire 
unit and an assertion that the statutory procedure applies "at least in certain respects."19 
In support of its argument, PBA does not cite to case law specifically holding that Civ 
Serv Law §75 is applicable to a City police officer in any respect.20 Instead, PBA relies 
on references to Civ Serv Law §75 in the three disciplinary pleadings in the record and 
in §18.7 of the agreement. 
Contrary to PBA's contention, the ALJ correctly concluded that the City is not 
bound by the asserted legal predicate contained in its disciplinary pleadings.21 
Nevertheless, we find some merit to PBA's argument that Civ Serv Law §75 is 
applicable to some PBA unit members based, in part, upon the parties' agreement. 
Section 18.7 of the parties' agreement is a negotiated health insurance benefit 
for police officers who are suspended pursuant to Civ Serv Law §75.3. When read in 
conjunction with General Order AGO-027-27, §G.1, stating that police discipline is 
appealable under Civ Serv Law §76, we conclude that both parties recognize in the 
agreement that Civ Serv Law §75 is applicable to at least some members of the PBA 
unit.22 This conclusion is supported by appellate precedent holding that the unique 
19
 PBA Brief in Support of Exceptions, pp. 7-10. PBA does not explain, however, to 
what extent it asserts Civ Serv Law §75 is applicable to unit members. 
20
 Our research has found two appellate decisions reviewing the imposition of police 
discipline in the City of Middletown. See, Birmingham v Police Commissioners of City of 
Middletown, 282 AD2d 531 (2d Dept 2001); Burns v City of Middletown, 119 AD2d 674 
(2d Dept 1986). However, the decisions are not dispositive as to the applicability of Civ 
Serv Law §75 to City police officers. 
21
 See, RacevKrum, 163 AD 924 (3d Dept 1914), affd, 222 NY 410 (1918). 
22
 By definition, Civ Serv Law §76 is applicable only to employees entitled to Civ Serv 
Law §75 disciplinary procedures. Montella vBratton, 93 NY2d 424 (1999). 
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procedural protections granted by the Legislature to honorably discharged veterans and 
volunteer firefighters under former Civ Serv Law §22, and currently codified in Civ Serv 
Law §75.1 (b), preempt police disciplinary procedures set forth in a city charter enacted 
by the State Legislature.23 
Therefore, consistent with our holding in Wallkill, we reverse the ALJ, in part, and 
conclude that PBA's proposals for disciplinary procedures and a bill of rights are not 
prohibited under Auburn and NYCPBA to the extent that they seek to replace Civ Serv 
Law §75 for unit members eligible, as a matter of law, to those disciplinary procedures, 
i.e. honorably discharged veterans and volunteer firefighters. 
We affirm, however, the ALJ's finding that the disciplinary procedure and bill of 
rights proposals for unit members subject to the City Charter police disciplinary 
procedures are prohibited subjects under NYCPBA and Mount Vernon. Our conclusion 
that the proposals are negotiable for those unit members eligible for Civ Serv Law §75 
under Auburn, does not preclude a scope decision finding that the same proposals are 
prohibited under NYCPBA for those unit members who are ineligible for those statutory 
disciplinary procedures.24 
In 1942, at the urging of newly elected City officials, the New York Legislature 
enacted a bill amending the City Charter by transferring the control and supervision of 
the City police department from the City Mayor to a newiy created five-member Board of 
23
 Eisle v Woodin, 205 AD 452 (4th Dept 1923), affd, 238 NY 551 (1924); Morris v 
Neider, 259 AD 49 (4th Dept 1940). 
24
 City of Albany, 7 PERB U1J3078 and 3079, confirmed, as modified, City of Albany v 
Helsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 PERB f7012 (3d Dept 1975), affd, 38 NY2d 778, 9 PERB 
H7005 (1976) (bargaining proposal to make Retirement and Social Security Law §360-b 
available to eligible unit members is a mandatory subject but a prohibited subject for 
unit members ineligible for those benefits.) 
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Police Commissioners.25 The expressed purpose for the legislation was to depoliticize 
and stabilize the City's police force, which had become a "political football" according to 
Assemblyman Charles N. Hammond, the bill's sponsor.26 In an effort to eliminate the 
problems caused by partisan-based police appointments and terminations, the Board of 
Police Commissioners was granted the following powers: to appoint police officers but 
only from competitive civil service eligibility lists; to enact, modify and repeal rules and 
regulations for the governance and discipline of the department; to discipline police 
officers pursuant to the procedure codified in the City Charter; and to compel testimony 
as part of investigations into "all matters pertaining to the police force."27 
Despite the public policy rationale for the amendments articulated in the 
legislative history, NYCPBA and Mount Vernon compel us to conclude that implicit in 
the 1942 special law was a policy favoring strong disciplinary authority by the Board of 
Police Commissioners that, in general, outweighs negotiability under the Act. As we 
stated in Tarrytown: 
In NYCPBA, the Court held that when a special state law, 
that pre-existed Civil Service Law (CSL) §§75 and 76, 
specifically commits the discipline of police officers to local 
government officials, New York's public policy favoring 
strong disciplinary authority over police officers outweighs 
New York's 'strong and sweeping policy' supporting > . 
collective negotiations under the Act.28 (footnote omitted) 
* L 1942, c 339, §1. 
26
 L 1942, c 339 Bill Jacket, Letter from Assemblyman Hammond to Governor's Counsel 
Sobel, dated March 24, 1942. 
27
 L 1942, c 339, §1, City Charter, §§129(2)-(9). Subsequently, the City enacted local 
legislation modifying the 1942 City Charter.amendments enacted by the Legislature. 
28
 Supra, note 10, 40 PERB 113024 at 3101. 
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In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ failed to follow the Board's analysis 
in Tarrytown and misinterpreted the City Charter provisions. We disagree. The 
disciplinary authority delegated to City officials by City Charter §§129.7, 129.8 and 
129.9 is far more specific and detailed than the charter provisions in NYCPBA and 
Mount Vernon, and the special statute in Tarrytown. In all three cases, the police 
disciplinary authority delegated to the local officials was found to preempt negotiability. 
According to PBA, the disciplinary procedures in City Charter §129.8 are 
superseded when "inconsistent with laws of the state." We reject this proposed 
construction of City Charter §129.8. The phrase referenced by PBA is, at best, a 
limitation on the powers of the Board of Police Commissioners with respect to the 
penalties that may be included in its rules and regulations. It does not constitute a broad 
statutory supersession clause with respect to the detailed disciplinary procedures 
outlined in City Charter §129.8.29 
As an alternative argument, PBA contends that the following two components of 
its disciplinary procedure proposal remain mandatory even if the proposal is generally 
prohibited: a) the provision permitting settlements for minor infractions without the 
issuance of written charges; and b) the suspension without pay provision. Contrary to 
PBA's argument, both aspects of the proposal are well within the police disciplinary 
authority delegated to City officials by City Charter §§129.7 and 129.8.30 Furthermore, 
29
 In contrast, Second Class Cities Law §4 states explicitly that all of its provisions may 
be "otherwise changed, repealed or superseded pursuant to law." See, City of Albany, 
supra note 11. 
30
 Although General Order AGO-027-27 cross-references Civ Serv Law §76, the 
adoption of that procedure by the Board of Police Commissioners was done pursuant to 
their authority under City Charter §129.8. Therefore, as a product of a special State law, 
the adoption of Civ Serv Law §76 does not render City police disciplinary procedures 
mandatorily negotiable for the entire PBA unit under Auburn. 
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unlike the proposal in City of New Yor/c31 we do not construe PBA's suspension without 
pay proposal to be a wage demand. 
We next examine PBA's additional arguments seeking to overturn the ALJ's 
conclusion that the bill of rights proposal is prohibited. As the ALJ correctly found, and 
PBA concedes, its proposal is virtually identical to the proposal we concluded was 
prohibited in Tarrytown. In Tarrytown, we specifically rejected an argument that the bill 
of rights proposal was mandatory based upon the dicta in NYCTA and the enactment of 
§209-a.1(g) of the Act. Nevertheless, in its brief, PBA makes the same argument 
without presenting any rationale for the Board to abandon our Tarrytown analysis.32 
In both WallkilP and City of Albany™ we recognized that the Legislature's failure 
to exempt police officers from coverage under 209-a(1)(g) of the Act supports a narrow 
construction of NYCPBA. Nevertheless, as we concluded in Tarrytown, the 2007 
amendment to the Act was aimed at overturning the Court of Appeal's decision in 
NYCTA, and not its NYCPBA decision. 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the bill of rights proposal is 
31
 40 PERB 1J3017 (2007), confirmed City of New York v New York State Pub Empl Pel 
Bd, 41 PERB 1J7001 (Sup Ct Albany County 2008), appeal dismissed, 54 AD3d 480, 41 
PERB H7004 (3d Dept 2008), Iv denied, 12 NY3d 701, 42 PERB 1J7001 (2009). 
32
 PBA's Brief in Support of Exceptions, pp. 20-21. 
33
 Supra note 12, fn. 46. 
The concurrence in City of Albany, however, did not reach the issue. Supra note 12. 
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prohibited35 under NYCPBA and Tarrytown for unit members ineligible for Civ Serv Law 
§75 procedures. We differ, however, with her rationale in part, which was based only on 
City Charter §128.7. In fact, City Charter §128.9 expressly grants the Board of Police 
' Commissioners broad investigatory authority to compel testimony, consistent with its 
rules and regulations, with respect to "all matters concerning the department or the 
duties of any officer." This City Charter provision deals directly with investigatory 
authority over police officers. Indeed, City Charter §128.9 is far more specific in its 
delegation of investigatory authority than the New York City charter provision in 
NYCPBA and the statutory provision in Tarrytown. 
Finally, we are not persuaded by PBA's argument that NYS Troopers PBA renders 
the bill of rights proposal mandatory.36 In NYS Troopers PBA, the Court held that an 
employee organization waived the right of its members to representation during non-
disciplinary critical incident interviews. The holding in NYS Troopers PBA cannot be 
reasonably interpreted as upholding the "validity of the contractual disciplinary due 
process provisions"37 or constituting an implicit overruling of NYCPBA where interrogation 
procedures in an expired agreement for police officers were found to be prohibited. 
We also affirm the ALJ's alternative conclusion that §1.D.7 of the proposal, which 
seeks to negotiate rights relating to a criminal investigation, is nonmandatory because 
criminal investigations are not a term and condition of employment under the Act. See, 
City of Rochester, 12 PERB 1J3010 (1979). We are not persuaded by PBA's assertion 
that City of Rochester is distinguishable or that §1.D.7 should be analyzed under City of 
Cohoes, 31 PERB 1J3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters ofCohoes, 
Local 2562 v Cuevas, 32 PERB ^7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), nor affd, 276 
AD2d 184, 33 PERB U7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 1J7018 
(2001). Nevertheless, we deem the bill of rights proposal to be non-unitary and 
therefore will not order the remainder of the proposal withdrawn with respect to those 
PBA unit members eligible to Civ Serv Law §75 procedures. 
36
 Supra note 7. 
PBA's Brief in Support of Exceptions p. 18. 
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B. City's Exceptions to ALJ's Decision 
In its exceptions, the City asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that PBA's 
GML §207-c proposal is mandatory.38 We disagree. 
PBA's proposed GML §207-c procedure includes a 15-day limitation relating to 
the following three distinct acts in the initial eligibility process: a) the time for filing an 
application for benefits; b) the time for the claims manager to render an initial eligibility 
determination; and c) the time for a claimant to request an arbitral hearing to review the 
claims manager's denial of an application for benefits. 
The proposed GML §207-c procedure also permits a claimant, following a 
request for a hearing with respect to an initial determination, to request reconsideration 
by the claims manager of the determination through submission of additional 
information. Within seven days following receipt of the request for reconsideration, the 
claims manager must determine whether to modify the determination under 
consideration at the hearing. 
Contrary to the City's assertion, the proposed 15-day time limitation for 
38
 The City's exceptions are limited to the proposed procedures for initial GML §207-c 
eligibility determinations. The exceptions do not address the negotiability of PBA's 
proposed procedures relating to disputes over light duty assignments and the termination 
of benefits. Therefore, they are waived. Rules of Procedure §213.2. We note, however, 
that the negotiability analysis with respect to GML §207-c termination procedures must 
include consideration of the property right protected by constitutionally-based minimum 
due process requirements. Uniform Firefighters ofCohoes v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 
686(2000). . 
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determining an application for GML §207-c procedures is mandatorily negotiable. 
While it is well-settled that GML §207-c grants a municipality the authority to make an 
initial eligibility determination, the proposed time limitation for a determination does not 
usurp that statutory right.40 The argument that the proposed timeframe is unreasonable 
and impractical targets the merits, rather than the negotiability, of the proposal. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the proposed reconsideration 
procedure. The proposed procedure is fully consistent with the maintenance of the 
City's statutory right to make eligibility determinations. There is nothing in GML §207-c 
that precludes a municipality from reconsidering its determination after receiving and 
evaluating additional information submitted by a claimant. 
The City also asserts that the proposed seven-day period for the claims manager 
to review the new documentation is too short to conduct an adequate review and 
investigation of the request for reconsideration.41 This concern, along with the City's 
expressed fear of potential future manipulation of the proposed procedure by claimants, 
is relevant to the merits of the proposal, but not to its negotiability. 
Finally, we turn to the City's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion "that the 
39
 See, City of Schenectady, 19 PERB H4544 (1986), affd, 19 PERB H3051 (1986), 
confirmed City of Schenectady v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 135 Misc2d 1088, 
19 PERB H7023 (Sup Ct Albany County 1986) affd, 132 AD2d 242, 20 PERB H7022 (3d 
Dept 1987), Iv denied, 71 NY2d 803, 21 PERB 1J7007 (1988); City of Schenectady, 24 
PERB H3016 (1991); City of Schenectady, 25 PERB 1f3022 (1992) confirmed sub nom; 
in part, and modified in part, Schenectady PBA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 25 
PERB H7009 (Sup Ct Albany County 1992), affd, as modified, 196 AD2d 171, 27 PERB 
H7001 (3d Dept 1994) affd, 85 NY2d 480, 28 PERB 1J7005 (1995). 
40
 See, Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB U3008 (2007), confirmed, Town ofOrangetown 
v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB H7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). 
41
 City's Brief in Support of Statement of Exceptions pp, 6-8. 
Case No. U-27423 - 1 6 -
proposed arbitration procedure is mandatorily negotiable under Watertown Police 
Benevolent Association42 (hereinafter Watertown) and Poughkeepsie Firefighters' 
Association, Local 596, IAFF43 (hereinafter Poughkeepsie). 
The provisions and legislative history of the Act reflect New York's explicit, strong 
and sweeping public policy favoring the negotiability of grievance-arbitration procedures 
for the resolution of public sector labor disputes. As the. Court of Appeals noted in 
Board of Education of Watertown City School District v Watertown City School District44 
The enormous growth in the use of collective bargaining 
agreements has generated vast experience in drafting 
arbitration clauses. Public sector parties may now use 
phrases that have been litigated into familiarity. They are 
free to negotiate language that will define disputes in areas 
of the broadest permissible scope. Parties are likewise free 
to negotiate exclusions, and to word arbitration clauses with 
sufficient clarity for a court to be able to tell, on a threshold 
determination, whether they intended a permissible subject 
or type of dispute to be arbitrable or not.45 
At the same time, the scope of mandatorily negotiable arbitration procedures can be 
subject to public policy limitations established by the Legislature, in statute, or otherwise 
42
 30 PERB 1J3072 (1997), confirmed, City of Watertown v New. York State Pub Empl 
RelBd, 31 PERB 1R013 (Sup Ct Albany County 1998), revd, 263 AD2d 797, 32 PERB 
H7016 (3d Dept 1999), revd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007 (2000). 
43
 36 PERB 1J3014 (200.3), annulled sub nom. Poughkeepsie Prof Firefighters' Assn, 
Local 596, IAFF v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 36 PERB 1J7016 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 2003), revd, 16 AD3d 797, 38 PERB 1(7005 (3d Dept 2005), affd, 6 NY3d 514, 
39 PERB 1J7005 (2006) 
44
 93 NY2d 132, 32 PERB H7502 (1999). 
93 NY2d at 141-142, 32 PERB H7502 at 7510. 
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determined by controlling decisional law. 
. The Court of Appeals 4-3 decision in Watertown, upholding an arbitration proposal 
with respect to GML §207-c determinations, is reflective of the tension that exists in the law 
between the expressed public policy favoring the negotiability of grievance-arbitration 
procedures in the public sector and decisional law, interpreting statutes external to the Act 
determining that a particular subject is either nonmandatory or prohibited. 
In Watertown, the majority upheld the Board's decision finding the following 
proposed general arbitration clause was mandatory under the Act: 
Article 14, Section 12-Miscellaneous Provision--the PBA is 
not seeking to divest any (purported statutory) right the City 
may have under § 207(c) to initially determine whether the 
officer was either injured in the line of duty or taken sick as a 
result of the performance of duty, but rather, the PBA seeks 
to negotiate the forum-and procedures associated 
therewith-- through which disputes related to such 
determinations are processed, to wit: should the officer 
disagree with the City's conclusion, the PBA proposes the 
expeditious processing of all disputes related thereto to final 
and binding arbitration pursuant to PERB's Voluntary 
Disputes Resolution Procedure. 
In contrast, the dissent in Watertown opined that the majority's decision was 
inconsistent with GML §207-c, its' legislative history and precedent holding that eligibility 
determinations are within the sole province of the municipality. 
In Poughkeepsie, a unanimous Court affirmed the confirmation of a Board 
decision finding that a much more elaborate proposed arbitration procedure is 
46
 See, Watertown, supra note 42; Schenectady PBA v. New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bd, supra note 39; NYCPBA, supra note 7; County of Chautauqua v CSEA, 8 NY3d 
513, 40 PERB 1J7522 (2007); City of Long Beach v CSEA, 8 NY3d 465, 40 PERB 1J7521 
(2007); Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 9 PERB 1J7529 
(1976). 
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nonmandatory. In Poughkeepsie, we concluded, based on our interpretation of the 
proposal, that the proposal sought to give an arbitrator the authority to determine a 
firefighter's statutory claim of entitlement to GML §207-a benefits, rather than limiting 
the arbitrator's binding power to review the City's initial determination. 
In the present case, PBA's GML 207-c proposal is mandatory under both 
\Natertown and Poughkeepsie.47 Like the proposal in Watertown, it seeks an arbitral 
process to resolve disputes over GML §207-c benefits while at the same time 
recognizing the City's statutory right to determine initial eligibility. Contrary to the City's 
argument, permitting reconsideration by the claims examiner of the initial eligibility 
determination does not render the proposal nonmandatory; rather, it constitutes a 
further recognition of the City's statutory right under GML §207-c. 
In addition, the proposal is mandatory under Poughkeepsie. It expressly 
proposes that the arbitrator's scope of review will be limited to determining whether the 
claims manager had a reasonable basis for the eligibility determination based upon the 
record before him or her. The mandatory nature of the proposal under Poughkeepsie is 
further bolstered by the proposed prohibition against either party presenting any new 
documentary evidence at arbitration. 
Finally, we reject the City's contention that the proposal is nonmandatory under 
Poughkeepsie because it permits parties to subpoena witnesses. We interpret the 
subpoena provision, in conjunction with the clause permitting testimony at the 
arbitration, as granting the arbitrator the discretion to permit testimony by the individuals 
whose reports were reviewed by the claims manager. A trial may be ordered to resolve 
Therefore, we need not reach PBA's argument that Poughkeepsie should be 
overruled. 
Case No. U-27423 19 
certain questions of fact in an Article 78 proceeding seeking review of an administrative 
determination issued without a hearing.48 Therefore, nothing in Poughkeepsie prohibits 
PBA's proposal that would grant an arbitrator the discretion to hear testimony to the 
same extent that a court might hear testimony in an Article 78 proceeding.49 
Based on the foregoing, we grant PBA's exceptions, in part, and deny the City's 
exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ, as modified. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the PBA immediately withdraw its 
disciplinary procedure and bill of rights proposals for unit employees who are ineligible 
for Civ Serv Law §75 procedures. 
DATED: September 17, 2009 
Albany, New York 
%4^ >d s&ZC; 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
48
 CPLR §7804(g); see also, Kirley v Department of Fire, City of Oneida, 138 AD2d 842 
(3d Dept 1988); Faliveno v CityofGloversville, 215 AD2d 71 (3d Dept 1995), appeal 
dismissed, 87 NY2d 896 (1995); Iv denied, 87 NY2d 1055 (1996). See generally, 
Mandle v Brown, 5 NY2d 51 (1958). In addition, discovery may be ordered, when 
appropriate, pursuant to CPLR §408. 
49
 By analogizing to CPLR Article 78 procedures, it is clear that a de novo review by an 
arbitrator would be inappropriate. Furthermore, we are not suggesting that a binding 
award by an arbitrator provides the only acceptable procedure or standard that would 
be consistent with Poughkeepsie. By way of example, an advisory arbitration proposal 
would be mandatorily negotiable if it protected a municipality's statutory right to render 
an initial GML §207-c eligibility determination, and, at the same time, granted a claimant 
with an opportunity to obtain an advisory opinion with respect to the underlying statutory 
claim. See, Plainedge Fed of Teach v Plainedge Union Free Sch Dist, 58 NY2d 902 
(1983). 
